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In 1945, United States v. Aluminum Corporation of America
(Alcoa) established that the Sherman Act applied to foreign conspir-
acies solely because they affected U.S. commerce. Since that time,
1. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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the governments and commentators of the United States' principal
trading partners have opposed this broad extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust laws.2 The '"4lcoa effects test" permits the applica-
tion of U.S. law to alleged activities occurring entirely outside the
United States involving no U.S. actors. 3 It is generally believed
within the United States that such a test is necessary to avoid the
subversion of the U.S. antitrust laws by domestic corporations acting
through foreigners and subsidiaries.4 This broad application of the
U.S. antitrust laws threatens the domestic sovereignty and economic
policies of foreign nations. It conflicts with the regulation by other
nations of their domestic economies,5 denies access to American
markets for foreign firms complying with their own domestic law,
and creates an aura of American legal imperialism over the world
economy. Thus, despite the need for an extraterritorial antitrust law,
there is a more pressing need for a principled restraint of the Alcoa
effects test.
Several doctrines temper the application of the Alcoa test.
When a foreign government is a defendant in an antitrust claim, a
U.S. court may lack jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act.6 Further, the act of state doctrine, barring U.S. courts
from hearing a claim against a private citizen acting on behalf of his
own government, may preclude the court from hearing a claim
otherwise satisfying the Alcoa test.7 And finally, the courts have
enunciated a wide-ranging list of factors which restrain the test's
application.8 The factors highlight foreign state interests and the
executive pre-eminence in foreign policy. Even this jurisdictional
rule of reason,9 however, does not satisfy the Alcoa test's foreign
opponents.
This Note assesses the present restraints on the Alcoa effects test
and concludes that they do not adequately address the foreign inter-
2. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text. Lord Lloyd of Kilgerran, Esher
Sury, England, stated that "[t]he United Kingdom is not alone in objecting. Some 20
countries have enacted blocking statutes primarily as a reaction to the unacceptable
extension of [U.S.] jurisdiction." U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) 214 (Nov. 25, 1981). See
generally Maechling, Uncle Sam's Long Arm, 63 A.B.A.J. 372 (1977).
3. See infra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
4. See Petit & Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial ApplicatIon of
United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW 697, 697-99, 714-15 (1982).
5. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 51, 60 & 65 and accompanying text.
9. Though the jurisdictional rule of reason is occasionally referred to as the "comity
doctrine," the factors cited as composing it involve much more than notions of comity.
The factors seek to measure fairness and the nexus of the alleged activity to the United
States; therefore, the term "jurisdictional rule of reason" more accurately describes the
test.
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ests prompting its criticism. The restraints require judicial determi-
nations in an area primarily reserved for the executive and the
legislature. This Note proposes that the United States federal courts
temper the Alcoa effects test using the comparative impairment
interest analysis suggested by Assistant Attorney General William F.
Baxter. Under this test, the court's examination of the factors to be
used in determining whether to extend jurisdiction will be limited to
those relevant to a comparison of the effects which the application of
U.S. law will have on the internal objectives of the foreign nation
and the effects which the application of foreign law will have on the
internal objectives of the United States.10 This approach will
restrain the extraterritorial application of the U.S. antitrust laws,
taking account of the foreign economic interests prompting the
opposition to such application, and will prevent the federal judiciary
from addressing issues beyond its competence.
I
HISTORY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES
ANTITRUST LAW
A. THE ALCOA EFFECTS DOCTRINE AND THE TIMBERLANE
JURISDICTIONAL RULE OF REASON
The Sherman Act expressly applies to commerce with foreign
nations."I The Act's legislative history presents strong evidence that
Congress intended its coverage to reach beyond United States bor-
ders.' 2 Early cases, however, limited this application. In 1909, the
Supreme Court first ruled on the extraterritorial effect of the Sher-
10. See infra notes 118-43 and accompanying text.
11. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce ... with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal."
Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
Other trade regulation statutes similarly encompass foreign trade. The Federal Trade
Commission Act defines commerce to include "commerce ... with foreign nations." 15
U.S.C. § 44 (1976). The Wilson Tariff Act concerns persons "engaged in importing any
article from any foreign country into the United States" when such importation restrains
competition. 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1976). The Webb-Pomerene Act exempts from the Sherman
Act certain associations of persons engaged in export trade. 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1976).
Numerous other antitrust statutes explicitly affect foreign trade. See generally W.
FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1973).
12. For a complete discussion of the legislative history indicating Congress' intention
for the Sherman Act to have some extraterritorial application, see K. BREWSTER, ANTI-
TRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 18-21 (1958). Senator Hoar, author of the
version of the Sherman Act that was enacted, stated: "The great thing that this bill does,
except affording a remedy, is to extend the common-law principles, which protected fair
competition in trade in old times in England, to international and interstate commerce in
the United States." Id at 21.
Brewster summarizes the legislative history as follows:
19831
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man Act. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 13 the Ameri-
can Banana Company, a U.S. corporation, alleged that another U.S.
corporation doing business in Costa Rica had engaged in predatory
practices that violated the Sherman Act. Justice Holmes upheld a
lower court dismissal on the ground that the Act did not extend to
activities performed outside of the United States that were legal
within the jurisdiction in which they occurred.' 4 Read broadly,
American Banana exhibits a strict view that a nation has exclusive
jurisdiction over activity within its territory. The extraterritorial
exercise of jurisdiction diminishes the sovereignty of the foreign
nation, and gains validity only by that nation's consent. 15 Subse-
quent cases narrowed American Banana, allowing the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. antitrust law when the complainant alleged that some
activity occurred in the United States affecting U.S. commerce.'
6
The territorial nexus necessary to invoke U.S. antitrust law eventu-
ally became more attenuated,' 7 culminating in its abandonment in
[I]t seems that there were at least two separate and distinct objects of legislative
concern with foreign arrangements: an application of the relationship between
imports and domestic competition, and a desire on the part of some at least to
prevent the act's evasion by jurisdiction-hopping on the part of American con-
cerns .... Competition within, or effects upon, foreign markets did not seem to
be a matter of congressional concern.
Id See also W. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN LAW (1910).
13. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
14. Id at 356-57, 359.
15. For a discussion of the territorial principle, as described by Chief Justice Mar-
shall, see Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135-36 (1812).
16. In Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917), defendants alleged a combination in
restraint of the shipping trade between New York and South Africa. The Court found
that "the combination affected foreign commerce of [the United States] and was put into
operation here." Id at 88. In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), the
Court found a "conspiracy entered into by parties within the United States and made
effective by acts done therein. The fundamental object was control of both importation
and sale of sisal and complete monopoly of both internal and external trade and com-
merce therein." Id at 276. The Court felt justified in examining foreign conduct on the
basis of both the unlawful acts performed in the United States and the intended and
actual effect on U.S. imports and the U.S. sisal market. "[B]y their own deliberate acts,
here and elsewhere, they brought about forbidden results within the United States." Id
See generally Kintner & Halgarten, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to For-
eign Trade and Commerce-Variations on American Banana Since 1909, 15 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 343 (1973).
17. In United States v. 383,340 Ounces of Quinine Derivatives, Admiralty No. 98-
242 (S.D.N.Y. 1928) and United States v. 5,898 Cases Sardines, Admiralty No. 105-37
(S.D.N.Y. 1930), imported commodities were sold in the United States pursuant to a
foreign agreement in restraint of trade. This created a sufficient basis for the application
of U.S. law because U.S. commerce in the commodities was substantially affected.
In Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31, 35 (7th Cir. 1944), an action brought under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, the defendant circulated advertisements in Latin America which
made false representations concerning correspondence courses offered through a U.S.
mail-order school. According to the court, "Congress has the power to prevent unfair
trade practices in foreign commerce by citizens of the United States, although some of
the acts are done outside the territorial limits of the United States." Id at 35. The
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Alcoa. 18
Alcoa was the first case to bring wholly foreign conduct within
the ambit of the U.S. antitrust law based solely on effects within the
United States or upon U.S. commerce with foreign nations. Six for-
eign aluminum producing corporations, including a wholly-owned
Canadian subsidiary of Alcoa, formed a Swiss corporation, Alli-
ance.19 The court found that Alcoa, a U.S. corporation, was not a
party to Alliance despite the participation of Aluminum Limited, its
Canadian subsidiary. 20 The Alliance shareholders incorporated the
U.S. market into a pre-existing quota arrangement. 21 The Alliance
cartel2 2 allocated a "free" quota to each shareholder, and charged a
royalty for sales above that quota, graduated progressively according
to the excess. 23 Alliance distributed the royalties as dividends to its
shareholders.2 4 The cartel allowed producers to charge any price,
but evidence from past practices and implications in the agreement
indicated that the arrangement effectively set a minimum price.
25
Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the court, held the Alliance
agreement unlawful under Section One of the Sherman Act.
26
To determine the applicability of the Sherman Act to an agree-
ment among persons not in allegiance to the United States, Hand
primary unlawful activities occurred outside of the United States, however, they were
planned in the United States and were performed by U.S. citizens.
The power of U.S. courts over U.S. citizens was also the basis for the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law in Bulova Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir.), a id, 344
U.S. 280 (1952). There, the Bulova Watch Company alleged trademark infringement
and unfair competition in Mexico. Watches bearing the trademark "Bulova" were sold
by Steele in Mexico and some found their way into U.S. commerce. Several watch parts
were also purchased by Steele in the United States. The Fifth Circuit exercised jurisdic-
tion and applied United States law to acts in Mexico because no conflict with Mexican
sovereignty was apparent. The Supreme Court, affirming, distinguished American
Banana, stating that "the holding in that case was not meant to confer blanket immunity
on trade practices which radiate unlawful consequences here, merely because they were
initiated or consummated outside the territorial limits of the United States." 344 U.S. at
288.
18. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. Because a quorum of the Supreme
Court could not be obtained, the appeal was transferred to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals as a special statutory court, pursuant to Act of June 9, 1944, Pub. L. No. 332, 58
Stat. 272 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1976)). United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 322 U.S. 716 (1943).
19. 148 F.2d at 442.
20. Id
21. Id
22. In a passing reference, the court pierced the Swiss corporate veil and found that
Alliance was an agreement or cartel, and not an independent corporation. Id This
finding brought Alliance within the contract, combination or conspiracy requirement of
the Sherman Act, Section One.
23. Id at 443.
24. Id.
25. Id
26. Id. at 445.
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considered congressional intent and the "limitations customarily
observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers." 27 He con-
cluded that, at a minimum, the Act prohibits agreements that both
intend to affect and actually affect U.S. imports.2 8 Because the Alli-
ance quota system included the U.S. market for aluminum, the
agreement clearly intended to affect United States imports.2 9 The
court then imposed the burden of proof on the defendant producers
to show the absence of actual effect on United States imports.30 Alu-
minum Limited failed to meet this burden, and the court found the
Alliance agreement in violation of the Sherman Act.
3'
Alcoa departed from earlier cases in several respects: the actors
were not U.S. citizens, the agreement was formed outside the United
States, and the court did not require that the plaintiff identify U.S.
agents. 32 Alcoa merely required that the plaintiff establish the
defendants' intent to affect U.S. commerce, 33 and the activity's actual
effect on such commerce. This test was subsequently labeled the
Alcoa effects test. If the plaintiff could show that the defendants
expressed the requisite intent in a contract, then the burden shifted
to the defendants to show no actual effect on U.S. commerce.
Alcoa's requirement that the conduct or agreement have an
effect on United States commerce is vague. Courts and commenta-
tors have described the standard in various ways. 34 None of them,
27. Id at 443.
28. Id at 444.
29. Id
30. Id at 444-45.
31. Id at 445.
32. After citing earlier cases that had required plaintiffs to show a U.S. agent, the
court stated:
It is true that in those cases the persons held liable had sent agents into the
United States to perform part of the agreement; but an agent is merely an ani-
mate means to executing his principal's purposes, and, for the purposes of this
case, he does not differ from an inanimate means; besides, only human agents
can import and sell [aluminum] ingot.
Id at 444.
33. At least one subsequent case weakened the intent requirement by finding con-
structive intent sufficient to satisfy the first half of the Alcoa test. In United States v.
General Electric Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949), the court determined that the for-
eign company's activities were subject to U.S. law based on the Alcoa test because:
(1) the Dutch firm knew or should have known its conduct furthered the General Electric
Company's scheme to restrain foreign competition, and (2) there had been a significant
effect on U.S. commerce. Though there was evidence that the foreign company was
aware of U.S. antitrust laws, the court stated that specific intent to violate the law was not
necessary to satisfy the "intent to affect U.S. commerce" component of the Alcoa doc-
trine. Id at 891. Thus, the court found that a general intent, which might be inferred
from acts or terms of an agreement, coupled with an actual effect on U.S. commerce, was
sufficient for extraterritorial application of the Sherman Act.
34. See, e.g., citations in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1976). "In essence, . . . [t]here is no agreed black-letter rule articulating the
Sherman Act's 'commerce' in the international context." Id at 611, quoting Rahl, For-
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however, has reduced the uncertainty in applying the law to border-
line cases. Clearly, there is a need for an effects test. A strict territo-
rial application of the U.S. antitrust laws would thwart the goals
behind the laws, permitting foreign firms to engage in anticompeti-
tive activity denied to U.S. concerns. On the other hand, the unmiti-
gated application of the effects test places no substantial limits on the
reach of U.S. laws. Congress did not purport to regulate the world
economy when it enacted the U.S. antitrust law,35 nor would such
regulation be accepted by the international community. 36 Neverthe-
less, an unmitigated application of the effects test would regulate
large sectors of the world economy.
The first case to directly confront the deficiency of the effects
test was Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America37 (Timberlane).
In Timberlane, the Ninth Circuit recast the effects doctrine to articu-
late the factors that the court found lurking behind decisions apply-
ing it.38
The Timberlane Lumber Company, an Oregon partnership that
milled and exported lumber from Honduras,39 alleged that the Bank
of America and others conspired to interrupt Timberlane operations
in order to retain control of the Honduran lumber business for
individuals financed and controlled by the Bank.4° The defendants
effectuated their plan by enforcing claims against Timberlane's pred-
ecessor in the Honduran courts.4' The Honduran court issued
embargoes against Timberlane's subsidiaries and appointed an
interventor, who allegedly received Bank payments to "cripple and,
for a time, completely shut down Timberlane's milling operation.
' '42
Timberlane alleged that its inability to export Honduran lumber
affected U.S. lumber imports.
43
The Timberlane court found the effects doctrine inadequate for
eign Commerce Jurisdiction ofthe American Antitrust Law, 43 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 523
(1974).
A "direct effect" standard was applied in United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (E.D. Ohio 1949), modfed and affd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). Rahl
advocates extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law if a restraint "substantially
affects" U.S. commerce. See Rahl, supra, at 523. The distinction between direct and
indirect effects and the standard of substantial effect do not remedy the vagueness of the
requirement of an actual effect on U.S. commerce.
35. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
37. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
38. Id at 612.
39. Id at 603-04.
40. Id at 604.
41. Id
42. Id at 604-05.
43. Id. at 605.
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determining whether to apply U.S. antitrust law to the case.44 The
court stated that the effects test was "incomplete" because it failed
"to consider the other nation's interests . . . [and] the full nature of
the relationship between the actors and this country. '45 The court,
however, noted that United States courts, "even when professing to
apply an effects test," have often considered "comity and the prerog-
atives of other nations" in their decisions to apply U.S. law.46 To
incorporate these concerns more fully into the court's decision, the
court established a tripartite analysis.47 First, the plaintiff must show
some effect on U.S. commerce. 48 Second, the plaintiff must show
that the alleged restraint produced sufficient effect to be cognizable
as a Sherman Act violation.49 And third, the court should weigh fac-
tors of fairness and comity to determine whether to apply U.S. law.50
This tripartite analysis refined the examination of the effect on U.S.
commerce that is sufficient to warrant extraterritorial antitrust law
application. The long list of factors relevant to the third part of the
test, however, created an extremely broad inquiry. The factors
included:
1. The degree of conffict with foreign law or policy.
2. The nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal
places of business of corporations.
3. The extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance.
4. The relative significance of effects on the United States as compared to
those elsewhere.
5. The extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
commerce.
6. The foreseeability of such effect.
7. The relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad.
5 1
The court held that Timberlane satisfied the first and second
tests,52 but that the record below was insufficient to permit a decision
on the test of international comity and fairness.5 3  The court
remanded for a consideration of the factors relevant to the third test,
suggesting that the district court would have difficulty making a
determination because "it is clear. . . that the most direct economic
44. Id. at 611-12.
45. Id
46. Id at 612. The court stated that, "[t]he failure to articulate these other elements
. is costly, however, for it is more likely they will be overlooked or slighted in inter-
preting past decisions and reaching new ones." Id




51. Id at 614.
52. Id at 615 (numbering added).
53. Id
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effect was probably on Honduras. However, there has been no indi-
cation of any conflict with the law or policy of the Honduran
government."
54
The Timberlane analysis is known as the jurisdictional rule of
reason. 5 The Ninth Circuit further articulated this approach in
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co. 56 There, the court
reversed the district court, and applied U.S. antitrust law to foreign
activities. The district court had required a substantial effect on U.S.
commerce to apply the antitrust laws extraterritorially.5 7 The Ninth
Circuit cited Timberlane as eliminating the explicit concern for sub-
stantiality. The court stated that a consideration of the factors of
comity and fairness incorporates the substantiality standard. Fur-
thermore, the court explained that a court should balance the factors
proposed in Timberlane. The absence of a single factor was not
determinative.58 Not all of the factors considered must weigh in
favor of extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Instead, the factors
must, on balance, indicate that application is appropriate.
The Third Circuit adopted the jurisdictional rule of reason in
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. (Mannington Mills),5 9
restating many of the Timberlane factors and adding the following:
54. Id
55. Id at 613. The court borrowed the phrase from K. BREWSTER, supra note 12, at
446. The determination of whether to apply United States antitrust law is essentially a
determination of whether to exercise jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit applies the tripartite
Timberlane analysis to determine if the court should exercise jurisdiction. Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d at 613; accord Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1299-1300 (3rd Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
Other courts, however, apply a two-fold test: "(1) does subject matter jurisdiction exist;
and (2) if so, should it be exercised?" Conservation Council of Western Australia v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 518 F. Supp. 270, 274 (W.D. Pa. 1981). Thus, "the consider-
ations of international comity [can be] reviewed as part of the threshold jurisdictional
decision or in connection with a subsequent determination regarding abstention .. ."
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 680, 688
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). If the factors of fairness and comity are considered in determining
whether jurisdiction should be exercised, the first two tiers of the Timberlane tripartite
analysis would be used to decide whether jurisdiction even exists.
56. 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
57. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Exp. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1065, 1077 (D. Nev.
1973).
58. 556 F.2d at 428.
59. 595 F.2d at 1294-98. In Manninglon Mills, both the plaintiff and defendant were
United States manufacturers of floor coverings. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
secured foreign patents by fraud, which, if perpetuated in securing a domestic patent,
would violate the antitrust laws. The patents allegedly secured by fraud were issued by
twenty-six foreign countries. Although the plaintiff desired to resolve the matter as a
unitary one, the court declined to treat it in that fashion. Rather, the court stated that on
remand, the lower court would have to assess the involvement of each country against
the principles of comity. The result in each case would not need to be identical with
respect to the different nations or the different types of relief considered on the basis of
each nation's patent issue. The plaintiff sought treble damages and an injunction to
prevent Congoleum from enforcing the patents in their respective nations. Either or both
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1. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there.
2. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction
and grants relief.
3. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being
forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting
requirements by both countries.
4. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made
by a foreign nation under similar circumstances.
5. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
60
In a confusing opinion, the Seventh Circuit failed to apply the
jurisdictional rule of reason in a case where the defendants
defaulted. 6' It upheld a District Court's extraterritorial application
of the antitrust laws despite the lower court's failure to apply the
Timberlane comity and fairness factors. The court stated, "the Man-
nington Mills factors are not the laws of this Circuit. ' 62 It rejected
the amici curiae's arguments that the Timberlane factors weighed
against the application of U.S. law.63 The court also found little
value in remanding the case for a consideration of the factors, stat-
ing, "the District Court would be placed in the impossible position of
having to make specific findings with the defaulters refusing to
appear and participate in discovery."' 64 Thus, despite the amici's
arguments, the court found the factors inapplicable, at least when
foreign defendants default. It is unclear from the conflicting lan-
guage in the opinion whether the Seventh Circuit rejected the juris-
dictional rule of reason altogether or merely when defendants
default.
Whether a court views the Alcoa effects doctrine in its original
form, or as refined by the jurisdictional rule of reason, both the artic-
ulation of the standard and the relevant factors can vary greatly
of these types of relief could conceivably stand or fall after an analysis of the factors of
comity and fairness.
60. Id at 1297-98 (factors are renumbered).
61. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
62. Id at 1255.
63. Id at 1255-56.
64. Id at 1256. But see Recent Development, Antitrust Law.- Extraterritoriality, 21
HARv. INT'L L.J. 515, 522 (1980). The authors argue that the amici curiae could supply
the necessary material since the majority of factors considered would involve matters
external to the defaulter's alleged unlawful activities. The only factors in either
Timberlane or Mannington Mills that would perhaps require discovery of information
within the control of the defaulters are (1) intent to harm U.S. commerce and (2) the
forseeability of the effect on such commerce. If the plaintiffs' allegations on these points
are accepted for purposes of the balancing test, the analysis would not be significantly
impaired. Amid curiae, including affiliates of the defaulters or their governments, could
provide all other necessary discovery to the court.
The analysis proposed in this Note, infra notes 118-43 and accompanying text, can be
performed in the absence of defaulting defendants.
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from case to case.65 In addition, it is unclear whether all of the Cir-
cuits accept the rule of reason. Nevertheless, it remains clear that
Alcoa requires a finding that foreign actors intend to affect and actu-
ally do affect U.S. commerce. Once this finding is made, the courts
usually assess factors in the case that may cause the court to decline
application of U.S. antitrust laws. These factors are general in
nature, and create a broad judicial inquiry.
B. DEFENSES TO THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
Before assessing whether the U.S. antitrust laws are applicable
to foreign conduct under the Alcoa effects test or the jurisdictional
rule of reason, a U.S. court will first consider two independent
defenses to the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Both
defenses are invoked in cases involving foreign sovereigns. First, if a
foreign government is an actor in the allegedly unlawful conduct,
sovereign immunity may bar jurisdiction over the government in
U.S. court. Second, if a foreign governmental act is part of the alleg-
edly unlawful conduct, the act of state doctrine may prevent the
application of U.S. law to foreign private defendants. This section
explores the current scope of these two defenses and then discusses
65. The Timberlane factors, see supra text accompanying note 51, and the Manning-
ton factors, see supra text accompanying note 60, for example, are not identical in cover-
age or language. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 40 (1965) provides a third statement of appropriate factors:
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement
actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of
the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
These factors were each examined by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Vetco, Inc.,
644 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1981), in lieu of the longer list presented by the same court
in Timberlane, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
Brewster states the jurisdictional rule of reason factors as follows:
(a) the relative significance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad;
(b) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American
consumers or American business opportunities;
(c) the relative seriousness of effects on the United States as compared with
those abroad;
(d) the nationality or allegiance of the parties or in the case of business associa-
tions, their corporate location, and the fairness of applying our law to them;
(e) the degree of conflict with foreign law and policies; and
(f) the extent to which conflict can be avoided without serious impairment of
the interests of the United States or the foreign country.
K. BREWSTER, supra note 12, at 446.
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the interface of the defenses with the determination of the extraterri-
torial application of U.S. antitrust law.
L Sovereign Immunity
In the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),66 Congress
codified the long-standing doctrine that a foreign sovereign is
immune from SUit,67 absent its consent, unless the activities prompt-
ing the suit are commercial in nature.68 A court determines whether
the activity is commercial based on the nature of the activity rather
than its purpose.69 A foreign sovereign may regulate economic
activity without losing immunity from the antitrust laws;70 a foreign
66. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(0, 144(d), 1602-611 (1976)) [hereinafter referred to as FSIA].
67. Chief Justice John Marshall applied the doctrine in Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). In that case, the Court declined to exercise
jurisdiction over a sovereign defendant, holding that a foreign state was absolutely
immune from suit unless it consented. Marshall later modified this rule in Bank of the
United States v. Planter's Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824), where he stated that
'.when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it devests [sic] itself, so
far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes
that of a private citizen." Planter's Bank laid the foundation for the commercial activity
exception to sovereign immunity in the FSIA. See infra note 69.
68. Prior to the passage of the FSIA, the Supreme Court expressed concern for
United States foreign relations and the concept of separation of powers. See, e.g., Ex
parte Republic of Peru. 318 U.S. 578 (1943), where the Court referred to "the policy,
recognized both by the Department of State and the courts, that our national interest will
be better served . . . if the wrongs to suitors, involving our relations with a friendly
foreign power. are righted through diplomatic negotiations rather than by the compul-
sions of judicial proceedings." Id at 589. Courts deferred to State Department judg-
ments as to whether the defense of sovereign immunity ought to be allowed in a
particular case. See, e.g., Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). In 1952,
the State Department adopted the "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity, denying
the defense to a sovereign in cases involving commercial activity. Letter from Acting
Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to Department of Justice (May 19, 1952) reprinted in 26
Dept'l State Bull. 984 (1952).
69. FSIA. supra note 66, at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1976), provides:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case . . . (2) in which the action is based upon a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state: or upon an
act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere
and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
Commercial activity is defined as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall
be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transac-
tion or act rather than by reference to its purpose." Id at § 1603(d).
70. See International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), afj'd, 649 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as l4M]:
Note, Sovereign Immunity, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 835 (1980). The court in 1,4M
determined that OPEC's activities were not "commercial" within the FSIA. The pricing
mechanism was considered a means of controlling production of a prime natural
resource. As such, the regulation was an activity in which only a sovereign may engage
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sovereign operating a business through a corporation, however, is
not immune.7 1 The legislative history of the FSIA gives the courts
wide latitude in characterizing activity as commercial or
noncommercial.
72
2. Act of State
In the seminal act of state case, Underhill v. Hernandez,73 the
Court held that, "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own terri-
tory." 74 This doctrine has always influenced the extraterritorial
reach of U.S. antitrust law. The Court recently articulated the rea-
soning behind the act of state doctrine in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 75 where it stated:
The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the
Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of
foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further the country's pursuit of
goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the inter-
national sphere.
76
Rejecting an inflexible rule, the Court stated that a "balance of rele-
vant considerations" should determine whether United States courts
should invoke the doctrine.77 The import of the subsequent cases
interpreting the act of state doctrine is that courts should avoid inter-
and therefore was non-commercial. 14M at 567. The court found support for this char-
acterization in the United Nation's position that as a matter of international law a sover-
eign has the exclusive right to control its natural resources. Id at 567-68.
U.S. courts have also preserved the foreign sovereigns' antitrust immunity by finding
that it is not a "person" within the meaning of the Sherman Act, Section One. Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); IAM, supra note
70, at 570-72; Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp.
1291 (D. Del. 1970). Cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (a domestic state is not a
"person" under the Sherman Act). But cf. Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (for-
eign sovereign may be a plaintiff "person" under the Sherman Act).
71. In Outboard Marine Corporation v. Pezetel, 471 F. Supp. 384, 395 (D. Del.
1978), the court held that Pezetel, an agency created by the People's Republic of Poland,
was not immune from suit under the Sherman Act for allegedly unlawful activities in the
manufacture and sale of electric golf carts. Such activity was commercial under the
FSIA. Corporations and agencies created or authorized by foreign countries are explic-
itly covered by the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7, 12 (1976).
72. H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 16 reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6604, 6615: "the courts would have a great deal of latitude in determining
what is a 'commercial activity' for purposes of this bill. It has seemed unwise to attempt
an excessively precise definition of this term, even if it were practicable."
73. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
74. Id at 252.
75. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The Court stated that the doctrine was not compelled by
international law, id at 421, or by the Constitution, id at 423. It derives from the con-
cept of separation of powers in matters bearing on foreign policy. Id at 427-28.
76. Id. at 428.
77. The Court stated:
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ference with U.S. foreign policy.78 Invocation of the doctrine is an
exercise of judicial restraint.79 To apply the act of state doctrine, the
foreign sovereign's involvement must be significant.80 In addition,
[S]ome aspects of international law touch more sharply on national nerves than
do others; the less important the implications of an issue are for our foreign
relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political branches.
Id
78. In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 697 (1976),
the Court restated the act of state doctrine as follows:
The major underpinning of the act of state doctrine is the policy of foreclosing
court adjudications involving the legality of acts of foreign states on their own
soil that might embarass the Executive Branch of our Government in the con-
duct of our foreign relations.
Dunhill involved a suit by importers of cigars manufactured by nationalized Cuban firms
to recover large sums paid in error to interventors appointed by the Cuban government
for pre-nationalization shipments. The refusal of the interventors to repay the money did
not. according to a plurality of the Court, rise to the level of an act of state:
No statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cuban Government itself was
offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had repudiated her obligations in gen-
eral or any class thereof or that she had as a sovereign matter determined to
confiscate the amounts due three foreign importers.
Id. at 695. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 41 (1965):
[A] court in the United States. . .will refrain from examining the validity of an
act of a foreign state by which that state has exercised its jurisdiction to give
effect to its public interests.
Comment d Nature of act ofstate. An "act of state" as the term is used in this
Title involves the public interests of a state as a state, as distinct from its interest
in providing the means of adjudicating disputes or claims that arise within its
territory. . . .A judgment of a court may be an act of state. Usually it is not,
because it involves the interests of private litigants or because court adjudication
is not the usual way in which the state exercises its jurisdiction to give effect to
public interests.
79. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
984 (1977), where the court found that the act of state doctrine precluded inquiry into the
motivation behind an anticompetitive act of a sovereign to determine whether the act was
Instigated by private defendants. Here, the Libyan government had nationalized plain-
tiffs assets. Plaintiff did not challenge this nationalization; rather, he argued that
because of the conduct of the defendants, he was induced to take an intransigent bargain-
ing stance with the Libyan government, causing the government to nationalize his assets.
To examine whether the concerted action of defendants caused the nationalization, the
court would have had to inquire into the motive of the Libyan government for nationali-
zation. The court stated that "the issue of legality cannot be isolated from the issue of
motivation of the foreign sovereign." Id at 78. Because the court declined such an
inquiry, the private defendants were saved from liability for their alleged role in the
nationalization of plaintiffs assets in Libya.
80. The Supreme Court refused to allow the act of state defense in two cases where
the foreign sovereign was not sufficiently involved. In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,
274 U.S. 268 (1927), the Court rejected an act of state defense where the defendant
claimed that the foreign government merely approved the allegedly unlawful activity.
The Court also refused to base the defense on actions by a foreign government which
were induced by the defendants. The Court reaffirmed this position in Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). In that case, the Canadian
government appointed a private corporation as its exclusive wartime agent for the impor-
tation and allocation of vanadium. The Canadian corporation conspired with its U.S.
affiliate to exclude a competitor of the affiliate from the Canadian market. The Court
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the act of state defense is limited by a commercial activity exep-
tion,8t which parallels that under the FSIA.
82
3. Interface of the Defenses with the Jurisdictional Rule of Reason
The policies behind the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and
the act of state doctrine, while not expressly applied to the jurisdic-
tional rule of reason test, nevertheless, demonstrate a problem inher-
ent in it. The statutory defense of sovereign immunity and the
judicially created act of state doctrine originated in the separation of
powers concept. 83 Through the FSIA, Congress determined the
extent to which the judiciary could impact on the policies of foreign
states and on U.S. foreign relations. 84 The act of state doctrine,
through a practice of judicial abstention, mirrors that policy in situa-
tions not directly involving foreign sovereigns. 85 Both defenses
demonstrate the limitations of the judiciary in foreign policy matters.
The jurisdictional rule of reason requires the judiciary to determine
both foreign governmental reaction to U.S. jurisdiction and the
effects on U.S. foreign policy.86 The breadth of the jurisdictional
rule of reason analysis threatens to involve the courts in extrajudicial
inquiries and determinations. While it is clear that the Timberlane
held that the defendants were "not insulated by the fact that their conspiracy involved
some acts by the agent of a foreign government," noting that the plaintiff had not alleged
any wrongful activity on the part of the Canadian government and that there was no
indication of approval of the efforts to monopolize by an official of that government. Id
at 706. The Court's approach to the act of state defense suggests that it may apply only to
significant foreign acts. See also Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,
425 U.S. 682 (1976). Compare Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977), where the involvement of the foreign sovereign was, argua-
bly, more significant than in Sisal and Continental Ore.
An important corollary to the act of state doctrine is the foreign compulsion doctrine,
which immunizes conduct that is compelled by a sovereign as if it were an act of state.
See, e.g., Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D.
Del. 1970), where it was a complete defense to the refusal by defendants to sell Venezue-
lan crude oil to plaintiff that the Venezuelan government imposed a boycott forbidding
such sales. The court stated, "[w]hen a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have
no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the sovereign." Id at
1298.
81. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976),
where a plurality of the Court refused to apply the doctrine to the repudiation of a com-
mercial debt. See also Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western, Inc., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), where the court suggested that discovery may provide
sufficient information to determine if the Dunhill commercial activity exception applied
to the defendant's act of state claim.
82. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 67 & 75-78 and accompanying text. See also Industrial Invest-
ment Development Corporation v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 903 (19890) (the act of state doctrine "has emerged as independently
based on concerns of separation of powers").
84. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3-8 (1976).
85. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 51 & 60.
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court did not intend to merge the defenses into the jurisdictional rule
of reason analysis,87 the defenses demonstrate that the rule of reason
encroaches too far into the sphere of executive responsibility when it
overlaps with the foreign policy interests delimited by the FSIA and
act of state defenses.
The interest analysis approach proposed in this Note is con-
cerned with the policies of both the United States and foreign states
and, unlike the jurisdictional rule of reason test, expressly avoids
judicial determinations of foreign policy. The inquiry under the
interest analysis approach must follow consideration of the sovereign
immunity and act of state defenses. If one of the defenses applies,
then no further inquiry is necessary. If both defenses fail or are
inapplicable, then interest analysis is appropriate. At no time, how-
ever, should the court re-examine the determination of Congress
under the the FSIA or its corollary in the act of state doctrine.
Despite the interface between the defenses and the determination of
the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law, neither the juris-
dictional rule of reason nor the interest analysis approach obviates or
embellishes separate consideration of the defenses in accordance
with the distinct lines of authority interpreting them.
Although the two defenses focus on limiting the role of the fed-
eral judiciary in the foreign policy sphere, they do not address for-
eign objections to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law. This Note will consider the nature of these objections before
examining the interest analysis approach, which seeks to focus on
the fundamental State concerns and foreign objections in an effort to
accommodate both.
87. The court rejected the act of state defense which the defendant claimed on the
basis of judicial proceedings that were instituted by the defendant. The court stated:
Timberlane does not seek to name Honduras or any Honduran officer as a
defendant or co-conspirator, nor does it challenge Honduran policy or sover-
eignty in any fashion that appears on its face to hold any threat to relations
between Honduras and the United States. In fact, there is no indication that the
actions of the Honduran court and authorities reflected a sovereign decision that
Timberlane's efforts should be crippled or that trade with the United States
should be restrained.
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 608. Note, however, that though the court considered the act of
state defense separately and before discussing the jurisdictional rule of reason, the
inquiry into the factors of comity might make use of some of the same facts. The above
quoted passage, for example, suggests that Honduras had no policy which enforcement
of U.S. antitrust laws would impair, and that judicial involvement posed no threat to
U.S. relations with Honduras. Also, the court later indicated that the district court's
determination under the jurisdictional rule of reason would be difficult because the most
direct economic effect was on Honduras, yet no conflict with Honduran policy was
apparent.
1983] USE OF INTEREST ANAL YSIS
C. FOREIGN OBJECTIONS TO THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW
Foreign objections to the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. anti-
trust law essentially arise from the negative impact that reach has on
the objectives of foreign nations. The foreign objectives affected can
be discovered by examining each nation's legislation. The objectives
are the states' expressions of the interests they seek to protect.88 In
the antitrust context, foreign objections to extraterritorial reach
appear to arise from four sources of conflict: (1) different penalties
imposed by each government, although policy goals are similar;
(2) different views as to the activities that should be proscribed;
(3) different national economic goals; and (4) different views of the
reach of sovereign jurisdiction. 89 When such conflicts arise, foreign
nations may attempt to thwart the pursuit of the conflicting U.S.
objective through blocking legislation.90 This legislation inhibits dis-
covery and prevents the enforcement of United States judgments by
domestic courts.
Foreign commentators criticize the Alcoa effects doctrine for
conflicting with general principles of sovereignty. 91 The jurisdic-
tional rule of reason does not confront this objection. The
Timberlane court viewed its various comity and fairness factors as an
articulation of the elements entering into a determination under the
88. See infra note 150 for a discussion of the relationship of the objectives underlying
foreign law to the four sources of conflict set out in the text accompanying infra note 89.
89. K. BREWSTER, supra note 12, at 39. See also Miller, Extraterritorial Effects of
Trade Regulation, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1092 (1963).
90. For a discussion of foreign blocking legislation implemented in the United King-
dom, Canada, Australia, South Africa, The Netherlands, Italy, Germany, France and
Belgium, see Pettit & Styles, supra note 4; Comment, Foreign Blocking Legislation:
Recent Roadblocks to Effective Enforcement ofAmerican Antitrust Law, 1981 ARIZ. STATE
L. J. 945, 958-74.
91. Joseph J. A. Ellis, Member, Bar of the Hague, Netherlands, states:
It cannot be denied that jurisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty, and that exercise
of jurisdiction can never go beyond the limits of sovereignty itself.... The
mere fact that an act radiates effects upon foreign territory is not sufficient basis
for an assumption of jurisdiction by the foreign state unless, in the words of the
Permanent Court of International Justice, "one of the constituent elements of the
offense, and more especially its effects, have taken place there." In order to vest
jurisdiction in the foreign state, therefore, the effects must be a constituent ele-
ment of the crime.
111 U. PA. L. REV. 1092, 1130 (1963), quoting Case of the S. S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J., ser. A,
No. 9, at 23 (1927). Ellis also cites other European jurists who criticize the Alcoa effects
doctrine, supra notes 18-33, as a misstatement of the international law. Professor R. Y.
Jennings states that, "the Alcoa pattern of case goes too far when 'jurisdiction' is assumed
over foreigners' foreign agreements, merely because it has been possible to allege some
'effects' on United States imports or exports, and because the agreement would have been
illegal if made in the United States." I ll U. PA. L. REv., supra, at 1131. Professor J. N.
W. Verzijl asks, "how could [the AlcoaI order ever be directly enforced without a clear
infringement of Canada's territorial sovereignty?" Id at 1132.
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Alcoa effects doctrine. 92 Even if the various factors represent an
attempt to accommodate foreign interests, the uncertainty and
breadth of the rule of reason and its judicial application cause the
test to be of little comfort to foreign opponents of the effects
doctrine.
93
Foreign diplomats and legislators object to the exercise of juris-
diction and attempted enforcement of procedures and remedies by
U.S. courts beyond U.S. boundaries. 94 The tenor of these objections
suggests that the major problems are the lack of systematic attention
to foreign interests and the seemingly unbridled reach of the current
U.S. laws. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act95 and the act of
state doctrine96 are small inroads into the broad extraterritorial effect
given U.S. antitrust law. The international character of the contem-
porary economic environment clearly requires that U.S. antitrust
laws have some extraterritorial reach.97 The systematic considera-
tion of the fundamental foreign objectives implicated in an antitrust
case, which consideration is peculiarly within the competence of an
92. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
93. Commentators view the jurisdictional rule of reason as only a small improvement
over the Alcoa doctrine with respect to foreign objections. See Comment, Extraterritorial
Application of the Antitrust Laws and Retaliatory Legislation by Foreign Countries, II
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 577, 590-92 (1981). See also Pettit & Styles, supra note 4, at
714-15 (1982) (noting that the jurisdictional rule of reason has yet to produce a result not
co-extensive with the41coa doctrine). For discussion of the foreign dissatisfaction with
the uncertainty of the court-applied rule of reason, see Comment, supra note 90, at 962-
63.
94. In response to General Electric Co., supra note 33, for example, the Netherlands
,lodged several protests with the U.S. Department of State and enacted legislation
preventing compliance with U.S. court orders with respect to records and operations in
the Netherlands. See K. BREWSTER, supra note 12, at 46-50. See also Note, Section 6 of
Great Britain 'r Protection of Trading Interests Act: The Claw and the Lever, 14 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 457 (1982), discussing recent British legislation that undermines U.S. antitrust
judgments against British defendants by allowing the British Secretary of State to pro-
hibit compliance with discovery requests of foreign courts and by allowing a British citi-
zen to recover multiple damages paid pursuant to a foreign judgment. The British
Secretary of State, in introducing the legislation, stated that:
My objective in introducing this Bill is to reassert and reinforce the defences of
the United Kingdom against attempts by other countries to enforce their eco-
nomic and commercial policies unilaterally on us. . . . [T]he practices to which
successive United Kingdom Governments have taken exception have arisen in
the case of the United States of America.
[ . . ITihe United States has shown a tendency in certain respects over the past
three decades increasingly to try to mould the international economic and trad-
ing world in its own image.
Id at 457, n.2, citing 973 PARL. DEn., H.C. (5th ser.) 1533-34 (1979).
See also supra note 2; A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 361-72 (2d ed.
1970); Sanford, The Application ofthe Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States-
A Viewfrom Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978).
95. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 4.
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independent judiciary, is the approach which could best accommo-
date foreign objections. The following proposal for the use of inter-
est analysis in the determination of the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust law provides such an approach.
II
INTEREST ANALYSIS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
Some commentators have lauded the jurisdictional rule of rea-
son approach to the determination of the extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust law as an important improvement over the Alcoa
effects test.98 Assistant Attorney General William F. Baxter sug-
gests, however, that interest analysis, as applied in domestic conflict
of laws cases, may be superior to the jurisdictional rule of reason or
comity and fairness doctrine. "Although some tempering of the
[4lcoa] effects doctrine is clearly appropriate, the judicial application
of comity is a less than ideal solution." 99 Baxter contends that
"[c]omity is in the eye of the beholder and any long list of factors,
such as those in Timberlane, 'is simply an open invitation to the
court to decide for itself. . . .[I]t is doubtful that courts should take
on executive branch responsibility by making that type of judg-
ment.' ",o The problem with the jurisdictional rule of reason,
according to Baxter, is in the permissible breadth of judicial discre-
tion. Baxter proposes an interest analysis approach where "one asks
what laws and policies of the arguably interested jurisdictions are
implicated by the challenged acts. . . . [T]he courts must attempt
to balance the strength of the respective interests. . . ." He believes
that "in many cases. . . the apparent conflict is merely illusory."''°
98. See, e.g., U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) 211 (Nov. 25, 1981). Richard J. Favretto
noted that "[t]here is a recent judicial trend to recognize comity and conflicts of law
principles in seeking to moderate the application of the Alcoa 'effects' test in Sherman
Act cases of international sensitivity .... [The Timberlane standards are] widely
regarded as having a significant and desirable result." Id Professor Barry E. Hawk of
Fordham University Law School "explained that the jurisdictional rule of reason is very
important as a radical departure from the Alcoa test 'in that it includes directly and
expressly the discretionary considerations of international comity in balancing of
national interest and policies." Id at 213. But cf. Note, Timberlane: Three Steps For-
ward, One Step Backwards, 15 INT'L LAW. 419 (1981) where the Timberlane balancing
test is attacked on three grounds: "the text calls for resolution of issues beyond the com-
petence of the courts; it fails to clarify relevant issues and in fact further confuses them;
and it fails to adequately distinguish itself from other defenses and abstention doctrines."
Id at 425. The author contends that a return to the Alcoa effects test would be an
improvement. Id at 431.
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Among the factors cited by the Timberlane court are "the degree
of conflict with foreign law or policy, . . . [and] the relative signifi-
cance of effects on the United States as compared to those else-
where." 102 Consideration of these factors alone might approach a
simple interest analysis; to the extent that other factors affect the
decision, however, the jurisdictional rule of reason departs from the
method proposed by Baxter. As Baxter notes, "[tihe problem is not
one of etiquette, which the doctrine of comity suggests;" rather, the
problem is a conflict of laws and policies. 0 3 Baxter urges that multi-
lateral negotiation is the paradigm:
Over the long term, such problems can only be addressed effectively by inter-
national negotiation and agreement. In the shorter term, the courts can only
attempt to predict the . . . result of such negotiations by estimating the
strength of the competing interests and the extent to which these interests
would be impaired by a decision one way or another .... [The use of an
interest analysis approach] would force countries to think about and frame
their national interest .... [A] dialogue in this area could resolve many of
the disagreements about antitrust enforcement. ° 4
This section of the Note examines the use of interest analysis in
the determination of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law. The section introduces the interest analysis approach and
begins with a discussion of Professor Brainerd Currie's approach to
the concept of interest analysis. Although Currie's approach is not
as appropriate as Baxter's in the context of antitrust law, no discus-
sion of interest analysis would be complete without mention of his
view. Professor Currie's view is followed by a discussion of Baxter's
version of interest analysis and why his approach should replace the
jurisdictional rule of reason as the device tempering theAlcoa effects
doctrine.
A. CURRIE'S APPROACH
Interest analysis involves an examination of the governmental
policies behind the conflicting rules of decision of arguably inter-
ested jurisdictions to determine which interests shall prevail and
which policies shall yield in a conflict of laws decision. Proponents
of interest analysis generally agree that if only one of the jurisdic-
tions has an interest that would be promoted by application of its
rule of decision, while other relevant jurisdictions have no interest
which would thereby yield, the conflict is false and the court should
102. See supra text accompanying note 51.
103. U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) 213 (Nov. 25, 1981).
104. U.S. Import Weekly (BNA) 32 (Oct. 14, 1981). Baxter is reported as also stating
that "the hardest case is where one state encouraged the acts another seeks to challenge."
Id Insofar as Baxter is proposing that the act of state defense be merged into an interest
analysis approach, his proposal and the thesis of this Note are in conflict.
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apply the rule of the interested jurisdiction. Proponents disagree,
however, as to the proper disposition of cases involving true conflicts
of interest where more than one jurisdiction has policies that will
prevail or yield when the rule of decision is chosen.1
0 5
105. Early works suggesting an interest analysis approach include Freund, Chief Jus-
tice Stone and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1210 (1946); and Hancock, Choice-
of-Law Policies in Multiple Contact Cases, 5 U. TORONTO L. J. 133 (1943).
Professor Brainerd Currie has published extensively on the interest analysis approach
to conflict of laws issues. For Currie's general thesis, see Currie, Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171 [hereinafter cited as Methods and
Objectives]. Other articles by Currie applying his analysis in the context of specific
problems include: Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, 73
HARV. L. REV. 36 (1959); Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 964 (1958); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmen-
tal Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958); Currie, Married
Women's Contracts.- 4 Study in Conflicts-of-Law Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 227 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Married Women's Contracts]; Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudica-
tion Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205 (1958).
Baxter's approach to interest analysis is set out in Baxter, Choice of Law and the Fed-
eral System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963). For other approaches to interest analysis, see
Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173 (1933); Lor-
enzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924);
Scoles, Interstate and International Distinction in Conflicts of Laws in the United States, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1599 (1966); Traynor, Law andSocial Change in Democratic Society, 1956
U. ILL. L.F. 230.
Currie's approach is explained in the text accompanying infra notes 106-17; Baxter's
approach is explained in the text accompanying infra notes 118-43. A third approach
applies the rule of decision of the most interested jurisdiction by applying a test similar to
Baxter's. See, e.g., Freund, supra, at 1216-18; Lorenzen, Tort Liability and the Conflict of
Laws, 47 L. Q. REV. 483, 492-93 (1931). A fourth approach chooses the "more effective
and more useful law." See Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2
AM. J. ComP. L. 297, 301-02 (1953).
Cavers describes the "most interested jurisdiction" approach as follows:
The new conception views the basic problem as how to make that choice
between conflicting laws which will best accommodate conflicting state policies.
This renders it necessary to identify the respective policies and to decide whether
they truly conflict, whether the application of one law will defeat or impair the
policy objectives of the other. . . .
Where analyses of the policies underlying apparently conflicting laws do not
reveal the conflict to be false, nevertheless study of the circumstances of the
transaction or event out of which the controversy has arisen may disclose that the
reasons for the application of one state's law are significantly stronger than the
reasons for applying the law of the other state.
Cavers, Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, in
A.L.I., STUDY OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 154, 163-65,
app. (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963).
Baxter denominates the "more effective and more useful law" choice as the "super-
value judgment" approach. He describes it as follows:
Every choice-of-law case involves several parties, each of whom would prevail if
the internal law of one rather than another state were applied. Each party is
"right," "worthy," and "deserving" and "ought in all fairness" to prevail under
one of the competing bodies of law in the view of one of the competing groups of
lawmakers. Fact situations which differ only in that they are internal to a single
state have been assessed by the different group of lawmakers, and each has
reached a different value judgment on the rule best calculated to serve the overall
interest of its community. If attention is confined to the circumstances of the
immediate parties, the conflict between the internal laws and between the value
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Professor Currie has written extensively on the conflict of laws
problem in the context of interstate cases. He advocates the applica-
tion of the law of the forum when both the forum state and the for-
eign state have a valid governmental interest in the application of
their respective laws.'0 6 Currie finds some support for this approach
judgments they are intended to implement cannot be resolved by the judge
unless he is prepared to impose still another value judgment upon the contro-
versy. The judge who takes this approach must conclude, for example, that legal
systems recognizing past consideration in contract cases embody a juster justice
than those that do not.
Baxter, supra, at 5.
There is a plethora of additional variations on "interest analysis" that incorporate
some aspects of those approaches discussed supra and that introduce alternative consid-
erations. See, e.g., D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965); Leflar, Choice-
Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 267 (1966). See generally
A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, GENERAL PART (1967). For an eclectic
approach, see Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Law: A Conflict of Laws
Approach, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1025-29 (1976).
Currie's approach is singled out for comparison to Baxter's approach for two reasons:
(1) Currie and Baxter both have articulated their interest analysis methods more exten-
sively than other commentators; and (2) other versions of interest analysis either employ
similar concepts to those used by Currie and Baxter or advocate solutions without ade-
quate justificatory force.
106. Currie describes his approach to the determination of the appropriate rule of
decision in a given case as follows:
1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the court should be
expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision found in the law
of the forum.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should furnish the rule of
decision, the court should, first of all, determine the governmental policy
expressed in the law of the forum. It should then inquire whether the rela-
tion of the forum to the case is such as to provide a legitimate basis for the
assertion of an interest in the application of that policy. This process is
essentially the familiar one of construction or interpretation. Just as we
determine by that process how a statute applies in time, and how it applies to
marginal domestic situations, so we may determine how it should be applied
to cases involving foreign elements in order to effectuate the legislative
purpose.
3. If neFessary, the court should similarly determine the policy expressed by the
foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an interest in the application
of its policy.
4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the application of its
policy, but that the foreign state has, it should apply the foreign law.
5. If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the application of its
policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the foreign state
also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy, and, a fortiori, it
should apply the law of the forum if the foreign state has no such interest.
Methods and Objectives, supra note 105, at 178. When Currie refers to a "foreign state"
or to "foreign law," he is generally speaking of the interested non-forum state within the
United States, not an extranational state. Currie's analysis emphasizes the determination
of whether the policies underlying the forum state's rule of decision are implicated by the
allegedly unlawful activity. If the forum state has a policy that would be promoted by
application of the relevant rule of decision, then investigation into the policies underlying
the foreign state's rule of decision is rendered unnecessary. Thus, Currie's approach
ignores the foreign interests in any case that invokes the policies of the forum state to any
extent.
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in U.S. Supreme Court cases. 10 7 He contends that when the Court
decides that the interests of the forum state should yield to stronger
foreign state interests, "it has siniply legislated."'
0 8
According to Currie, congressional legislation is the ideal in the
interstate situation; however, his choice of forum law in true conflicts
is not an attempt to approximate the legislative solution. Currie
apparently considers the ideal unapproachable for a court acting
unilaterally. 10 9 Thus, the only appropriate resolution is an applica-
tion of the law of the forum with which the court is most familiar.
Currie advocates the application of forum law in true conffict cases
because the court "can be sure at least that it is consistently advanc-
ing the policy of its own state.""10
Currie finds little merit in negotiation between interested juris-
dictions as an alternative to his choice-of-law method in true conffict
cases."' He is uncomfortable with the possibility that some deeply
rooted policy could be bargained away in exchange for collateral
concessions in another case." 2 Currie recognizes a value in agree-
ments that control cases "in which a state asserts an unsubstantial, or
collateral, or predatory interest,"" 3 but not in agreements that con-
trol cases involving true conflicts.1 4 Currie's view ignores the exist-
107. See Methods and Objectives, supra note 105, at 177 (citing Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954)).
108. Id Currie explains that a "weighing" of interests is grounded in politics rather
than in jurisprudence:
I do not rail against this, nor do I intend to crusade against the usurpation. No
doubt the Court has been sorely tempted, seeing problems which it believes
should be solved in a particular way, and frustrated by the failure of Congress to
use its power to solve the problems. I simply want the record kept straight. I
want it understood that such action by the Supreme Court must find its justifica-
tion in politics, not in jurisprudence, and that its decisions in this field are to be
evaluated accordingly ....
We would be better off without choice-of-law rules. We would be better off if
Congress were to give some attention to problems of private law, and were to
legislate concerning the choice between conflicting state interests in some of the
specific areas in which the need for solutions is serious. In the meantime, we
would be better off if we would admit the teachings of sociological jurisprudence
into the conceptualistic precincts of conflict of laws.
Id at 177-78.
109. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
110. Married Women's Contracts, supra note 105, at 261-62 (footnotes omitted). Cur-
rie claims that the promotion of a foreign state's interests at the expense of the forum
state's interests is not a good reason for applying foreign law. Id
I 1l. Id at 263-64.
112. Id
113. Id at 264.
114. Currie does recognize, however, that international agreement may be the only
alternative to domestic determination. "[S]ince the international agreement is the only
method available to independent, sovereign states for the resolution of true conflicts of
interest, the limitations of that method may help to explain why continental legal systems
have adhered so persistently to the ill-fated efforts to find a metaphysical system for
resolving those conflicts." Id
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ence of foreign objections or obstructions to the application of forum
law.
Many commentators criticize Currie's formulation,11 5 but for
the purposes of this discussion, its primary fault is its inapplicability
to international conflicts. First, Currie's ideal in the interstate con-
text is congressional legislation. There is no corresponding body
available in the international sphere. Second, because courts are
restricted to individual cases, judicial analysis does not attempt to
promote the ideal. Third, Currie's approach provides no limitation
to the Alcoa effects test. 16 If a U.S. court has subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the action, then the action must implicate a U.S. interest.'"
7
A finding that a U.S. court has jurisdiction obviates any inquiry into
the interests of another jurisdiction. If a court applies Currie's
approach, then it will always apply U.S. law, whether the conflict is
false (no foreign interest) or true (both U.S. and foreign interests
implicated to some extent). As applied to antitrust cases involving
conduct abroad, Currie's method is tantamount to the Alcoa effects
test. If U.S. commerce is affected, then the court can exercise juris-
diction and apply U.S. law. Thus, Currie's approach, as applied to
extraterritorial antitrust enforcement, is a mechanical device for
determining the applicability of U.S. law. It provides litigants with
predictable results and promotes the consistent development of local
law, however, it also produces several difficulties in modern interna-
tional law.
In the international economic context, compromise is both nec-
essary and appropriate. In the long run the United States can only
promote the policies behind its antitrust laws if it can harmonize its
efforts with those of foreign jurisdictions. If the United States avoids
consideration of substantial foreign interests and refuses to compro-
mise its own interests, it will be unable to further even those policies
that compromise would leave intact. Thus, Currie's mechanical
approach to interest analysis is inadequate to deal with the problem
of determining whether to apply U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially.
Baxter's approach, also proposed primarily in the interstate conflict
of laws context, recognizes the need for compromise. As such, it
presents a superior method for the resolution of true conflicts in the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law.
115. See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, GENERAL PART
63 (1967). See also Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. I
(1963).
116. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of the threshold subject matter jurisdiction issue, see supra note
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B. BAXTER'S COMPARATIVE IMPAIRMENT APPROACH
In 1963, William F. Baxter criticized Currie's approach to true
conflicts, and applied the concept of comparative impairment inter-
est analysis to interstate conflict of laws cases."i8 In approaching a
true conflict, Baxter identifies the relevant state interests and assesses
the extent to which the application of one state's law would impair
the other state's objectives." 9 The court applies the law of the juris-
diction whose interests would be most impaired by application of
foreign law.120 Although Baxter proposed the comparative impair-
ment approach to interest analysis in the interstate conflict of laws
context, his justificatory arguments are sufficiently robust to apply to
international conflicts over the extraterritorial reach of sovereign
laws. 121
Baxter identifies two types of governmental objectives underly-
ing rules of decision: internal objectives and external objectives.'
22
Internal objectives resolve private conflicts arising from wholly local
activity.' 23 Such objectives prioritize local private interests. 124 They
are manifest in the rules of decision, both statutory and common
law, that resolve controversies between domestic actors.' 25 When a
controversy involves foreign parties, the internal objectives underly-
ing the rules do not provide a resolution. External objectives are
implicated. 26 External objectives apply the legal ordering used in
domestic conflicts to conflicts between a domestic party and a for-
eign party. They do not extend automatic protection to a domestic
party simply because it is domestic. Instead, the external objectives
protect the domestic party to the same extent that they would protect
that party in a wholly domestic dispute. 27 Thus, if the internal
objectives would not protect the domestic party in a wholly domestic
suit, the external objectives will not seek to protect the domestic
party against a foreign claimant.
This separation of interests into essentially identical internal
and external components, while a useful analytical tool, does not
118. Baxter, supra note 115.
119. Id. at 17-18.
120. Id
121. Baxter, in his present role as Assistant Attorney General in charge of antitrust,
has suggested publicly that conflict of laws interest analysis is superior to the Timberlane
factor test in tempering the extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws. See supra
notes 98-104 and accompanying text.







172 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:147
resolve the conflict inherent in determining the law applicable in a
dispute between two parties of different nationalities. Each nation
involved in the dispute has an external objective to protect its own
citizen. The external objective may be minimal, or it may be strong,
depending upon the degree of protection afforded the domestic actor
in a wholly domestic dispute. Resolution of any true conflict
requires the subordination of one or more governments' external
objectives to those of another government.1 28 Baxter advocates the
resolution of these conflicts through a comparative impairment
method. The court assesses the effect which each nation's law has
upon the domestic interests of the other nation. The court applies
the law which least impairs the other nation's internal objectives.
According to Baxter, it is possible to "apply a normative principle to
determine which external objective to subordinate. The principle is
to subordinate, in the particular case, the external objective of the
state whose internal objective will be least impaired in general scope
and impact by subordination in cases like the one at hand." 129 Such
an investigation "may be regarded as the measure of the rule's perti-
nence and of the state's interest in the rule's application within the
class of conflicts."
30
It is important to clarify what the Baxter test does not attempt to
do. First, the test does not rank the competing objectives. Unlike
the suggestions from other conflict of laws commentators,13' Baxter's
test does not prioritize each nation's internal, and inherently subjec-
tive, interests and require the court to make the pretense of objec-
tively deciding which interests are paramount. Baxter argues that
this "super-value judgment" is not appropriate for judges from one
of the interested nations.' 32
Baxter's approach merely assesses the impairment of interests
which are presumed to be equal. Each nation's implicated interest is
presumed to be equal with the other's, and the test addresses the
degree to which the application of one law will impair the other
nation's interest. Thus, Baxter's comparative impairment approach
does not attempt to prioritize the competing national objectives in a
conflict of laws case; rather, it attempts to select the law which mini-
mizes the impact oti the objectives. 33 Under Baxter's approach, the
application of one nation's law does not signify that the interest
which it promotes is more important than its competitor's, but
128. Id.
129. Id. at 18-19.
130. Id at 9.
131. See supra note 105.
132. Baxter, supra note 115, at 5, 22-23.
133. See supra text accompanying note 129.
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rather, that its impact on the other nation is less than the impact of
the competitor's law on its objectives.
34
Baxter admits that the application of his method to borderline
cases will be difficult. He contends, however, that many legal tests
are subject to the same criticism.135 The jurisdictional rule of reason,
for example, promotes an even broader and more difficult examina-
tion than does Baxter's approach to achieve the same result-the
principled limitation of the Alcoa effects doctrine.
A mechanical rule is easier to apply than a comparative impair-
ment approach, but it often defeats policy goals solely because of
fortuitous circumstances. Mechanical rules emphasize the goals of
uniformity and predictability, or protection of party expectations.
Such objectives fail to take into account "the normative criterion of
implementing state policies."' 36 Choice doctrines with uniformity
objectives implicate three concepts: primary predictability, secon-
dary predictability and doctrinal uniformity.
37
The goal of primary predictability seeks to enable actors to pre-
dict the legal consequences of their conduct at the time of perform-
ance. 138 Secondary predictability refers to the ability to predict the
consequences of past conduct in a particular forum. 139 Doctrinal
uniformity occurs when all possible forums would choose the same
rule of decision in a given case. 4° Any choice method uniformly
applied can achieve these goals; only extremely rigid mechanical
choice rules, however, would be superior to the application of nor-
mative criteria. 4 Baxter's comparative impairment method will
serve these goals; the application of normative criteria, however,
subordinates the goals to the objective of minimizing the impairment
of state objectives.
Currie contends that the application of normative criteria in a
choice rule is never appropriate for a court.' 42 Baxter rejects this
134. Baxter expressly rejects the ranking inherent in the "super-value judgment"
approaches. See supra notes 105 & 132. He nevertheless chooses to denominate law
selected by the comparative impairment test as the most "pertinent." Baxter, supra note
115, at 9. Despite the ranking notion connoted by the term "pertinent," this Note shall
hereinafter comply with Baxter's terminology.
135. Id
136. Id at 20. Cf. Note, Extraterritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict
of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1005, 1027 (1976).




141. Traditional mechanical rules such as lex loci contractus or lex loci delicti do not
satisfy the rigidity requirement because of the difficulty in characterizing a case and the
ambiguity in finding the appropriate lex loci See Baxter, supra note 115, at 3-4; and
Methods and Objectives, supra note 105, at 173-77.
142. Methods and Objectives, supra note 105, at 176.
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contention: "The question 'Will the social objective underlying the
[State] X rule be furthered by the application of the rule in cases like
the present one?' need not necessarily be answered 'Yes' or 'No;' the
answer will often be, 'Yes, to some extent.' "143
This Note asserts that the comparative impairment approach to
the determination of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law is superior to either mechanical rules or the jurisdictional rule of
reason as an effective means of tempering the Alcoa effects test. An
evaluation of this assertion requires analysis of a state's selection of a
choice method. The following analysis is premised on the funda-
mental idea of a state's pursuit of its own objectives.
C. A COMPARISON OF THE JURISDICTIONAL RULE OF REASON
WITH THE COMPARATIVE IMPAIRMENT APPROACH
A state confronting a true conflict has three alternatives in
determining the applicable rules of decision. It may (1) promote the
local interest whenever given the opportunity; (2) decide in an arbi-
trary, though arguably neutral, fashion which interest to promote
through the application of a mechanical choice rule; or (3) assess the
competing interests against normative criteria to find the most perti-
nent interest. 44 These alternatives can be evaluated by reference to
the long-run impairment of internal objectives. The alternative that
minimizes impairment is superior. Consider a jurisdiction that
chooses to promote its local interest whenever possible. That juris-
diction will be able to promote its internal objectives only when it is
the forum state, and only if competing states do not thwart enforce-
ment of its judgmients. Next, consider a jurisdiction which chooses
143. Baxter, supra note 115, at 22.
144. A fourth alternative would be to take the "super-value judgment" approach, dis-
cussed at supra note 105. This alternative is dismissed by Baxter as follows:
The drawbacks of this approach ... are easily identified. The judge is required
to formulate law in a much more frank and open manner than is generally
thought compatible with his non-political status .... Necessarily a super-value
judgment is disputable: the very occasion for its articulation is the existence of a
contrary judgment reached by one of the contending bodies of internal
lawmakers. Finally, the objective of primary predictability is not likely to be
furthered. The uniformity of outcome on which it depends will exist only if the
same super-value judgment is reached by all forums, consistently subordinating
the same local value judgment.
See Baxter, supra note 115, at 5. The approach fails to distinguish between internal and
external conflicts by only determining which internal resolution is best suited to an exter-
nal situation. It is the only approach that has little chance of providing primary predict-
ability because when the forum whose law is subordinated adjudicates a similar case, it is
unlikely to "reach a super-value judgment in conflicts cases contrary to judgments [it]
previously reached in internal cases which the approach does nothing to distinguish."
Id at 6. On the other hand, the application of normative criteria does distinguish exter-
nal conflicts from internal ones by recognizing that each jurisdiction is primarily inter-
ested only in the parties identified with it.
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an arbitrary mechanical rule. That jurisdiction will promote its
objectives only in fortuitous circumstances. Normative methods,
unlike mechanical rules, consider the unique factors in each individ-
ual case. In addition, normative methods are facially objective and,
unlike local interest favoritism, do not alienate competing jurisdic-
tions. Thus, normative methods are distinctly superior for determin-
ing the law applicable in a given case.
Aside from the substantive superiority of the application of nor-
mative criteria, an important, though subsidiary, concern is the
administrative cost of the choice rule. Always promoting the local
interest is clearly costless. Mechanical rules, however, are not likely
to be less costly than the application of normative criteria, because
the determination of the facts necessary to apply a mechanical rule
involves inquiries that most likely will be as costly as the determina-
tion of foreign and domestic interests invoked by-a particular contro-
versy. Furthermore, a court finding facts to apply a mechanical rule
is not able to depend on briefs of the parties or amici as is a court
determining what interests are invoked.
If all competing jurisdictions choose the interest that is least
impaired, total impairment aggregated across all competing jurisdic-
tions will be minimized. This method of selecting the applicable
law, however, will not necessarily minimize the impairment of a sin-
gle jurisdiction's internal objectives. If, for example, the relevant
objectives of U.S. antitrust law are always less impaired by the appli-
cation of foreign law than the objectives of foreign states are
impaired by the application of U.S. antitrust law, then the use of the
comparative impairment approach in all international cases will
maximize the impairment of the U.S. objectives. The application of
the law which least impairs the foreign state's objectives will, how-
ever, minimize the aggregate impairment of all nation's interests.
The above analysis illustrates that a state unilaterally determin-
ing a choice rule, in the general case, may not be satisfied with the
comparative impairment method. Consider, however, a narrower
inquiry. Assume State X is the dominant arbiter 145 of a class of con-
flicts implicating particular State X objectives. State X will seek to
choose the choice of law rule that will minimize impairment of its
objectives with respect to that class. If State X chooses to promote its
objectives whenever it is the forum state, 146 it incurs the risk that
states with competing objectives will thwart enforcement of its judg-
145. The term "dominant arbiter" denotes the state that will, in most or all cases, be
the situs for the resolution of the competing objectives. See infra notes 146-47 and
accompanying text.
146. Because State X is the dominant arbiter of the class of conflicts under considera-
tion, it will most often or always be the forum state.
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ments, thereby impairing State X objectives. If State X chooses an
arbitrary mechanical rule, then it will promote its objectives only
when the circumstances are fortuitous. If, however, State X chooses
to advance its objectives only when they are more pertinent, then it
will dissuade competing states from attempting to thwart enforce-
ment of its judgments by assuring those states that it will defer to
foreign objectives when they are more pertinent. Because State X is
the dominant arbiter of the class of conflicts, the prospects of avoid-
ing foreign objections, and promoting State X objectives when it is
most important to do so, are attractive. Thus, the application of nor-
mative criteria to that class of conflicts is the method most likely to
achieve those goals.
The United States is the dominant arbiter with respect to the
class of conflicts implicating the objectives underlying its antitrust
laws. Although in some cases the United States may suffer by not
applying its antitrust laws, it will benefit in the long run from the
comparative impairment approach because, as in the hypothetical
above, it is the dominant arbiter of those laws. The United States
must recognize the international opposition to the enforcement of
the U.S. antitrust laws and the resulting limits to their international
reach. 47 If the United States promotes its antitrust objectives when-
ever it is the forum state, it incurs the risk of further foreign blocking
legislation. If it applies an arbitrary mechanical rule, its antitrust
objectives will only be promoted under fortuitous circumstances. If
it tempers its enforcement in a principled manner, however, it will
achieve the greatest possible enforcement of those objectives. For-
eign states will be less likely to block U.S. judgments because of U.S.
deference to foreign objectives when they are more pertinent and the
United States will be able to advance its objectives when they are
most significant. A normative approach allows the United States to
achieve these goals. As the dominant arbiter in the enforcement of
its own antitrust laws, the United States should find a normative
approach attractive.
The jurisdictional rule of reason and Baxter's comparative
impairment approach are alternative normative tests for determining
the law applicable in a particular case. Three criteria provide the
standards for assessing these alternative methods: (1) The method
should provide the benefits that distinguish the normative approach
from mechanical and other rules; (2) The method should be appro-
priate for application by the judiciary; and (3) The method should
take into account the ideal of multilateral negotiation.
147. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
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The preceding analysis identified two primary benefits which
distinguish normative methods from mechanical and other rules.
First, the application of normative criteria to determine the state
with the more pertinent interest is more likely than the other
approaches to dissuade foreign states from thwarting U.S. judg-
ments, because the normative method compromises U.S. and foreign
objectives in a reasonable manner, thereby accommodating foreign
objections. Second, by choosing U.S. objectives when they are most
pertinent, the United States promotes its internal objectives in the
cases where the United States most strongly desires to regulate con-
duct. Because the jurisdictional rule of reason is a broader test than
the comparative impairment test, 148 it constitutes a greater threat to
each benefit of the normative approach. The jurisdictional rule of
reason does not focus on internal objectives. Rather, internal objec-
tives are only one component of a multifaceted analysis. 149 Thus,
when factors other than the conflict between U.S. and foreign poli-
cies weigh in the analysis, the jurisdictional rule of reason applies
normative criteria to considerations other than internal objectives.
The comparative impairment approach focuses exclusively on the
internal objectives of the competing jurisdictions. Because the end
result of the analysis is the decision whether to apply U.S. law, the
primary impact of the analysis is on the internal objectives underly-
ing that law. Foreign objections arise from the conflict between U.S.
and foreign internal objectives.' 50  The comparative impairment
148. See supra notes 101 & 103 and accompanying text.
149. In addition to a consideration of internal objectives, the courts establishing the
jurisdictional rule of reason have named several other criteria. See supra notes 51, 60 &
65 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text. Consider each of the four sources
of conflict which give rise to foreign objections to the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust law. See supra text accompanying note 89. A case implicates the first source
(different remedies to effect similar policy objectives) only when the foreign state's objec-
tives are affected by the case's outcome. The different legal approach to the promotion of
that interest will create conflict. The second source of conflict (differing policy objec-
tives) arises only when the foreign state's policy objectives will be impaired by applica-
tion of U.S. law. The third source of conflict (economic conflicts of interest) will arise
only when the foreign state expresses an economic interest through policy objectives
underlying its rules of decision. Likewise, the fourth source of conflict (different views of
the reach of sovereign jurisdiction) will arise only when a U.S. court impairs the internal
objectives of the foreign state. The objectives underlying the foreign laws, as indicated
by legislative histories, etc., will be the sole expression given by foreign states to signal to
the U.S. court their objection to the application of U.S. law. Although, as regards to the
third and fourth sources of conflict, one can attribute to a foreign state a desire to protect
its citizens from penalties imposed by a U.S. court when the activity invoking the penalty
does not adversely affect the foreign state's interests, this Note takes the position that
such a desire does not, as a general proposition, comport with notions of sovereignty and
therefore should be ignored. Clearly, consideration of such a desire is extralegal and is,
therefore, beyond the reach of a United States court conscious of separation of powers
limitations.
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approach directly confronts foreign objections and better accommo-
dates them. Therefore, the comparative impairment approach is
more likely than the jurisdictional rule of reason to dissuade foreign
states from creating obstacles to the promotion of United States
objectives, the first benefit of the normative approach.
For similar reasons, the comparative impairment method is
more likely to advance the second benefit of the normative
approach. By focusing exclusively on internal objectives, the com-
parative impairment approach promotes those objectives when they
are most pertinent. To the extent that the jurisdictional rule of rea-
son considers factors other than the conflict between United States
and foreign objectives, the method risks (1) choosing to apply for-
eign law when the U.S. interest is most pertinent, and (2) choosing
U.S. law when the foreign interest is more pertinent. These two
errors defeat the second benefit of the normative approach.
The second criterion for assessing the jurisdictional rule of rea-
son and the comparative impairment methods involves their imple-
mentation by the U.S. judiciary. Both methods require judicial
application. The U.S. judiciary is competent to interpret rules of
decision and analyze internal objectives, but is not competent to
engage in international economic policy-making.'15 The broad
inquiry under the jurisdictional rule of reason requires the court to
make determinations which are in the purview of the executive
branch of the federal government. 52 The comparative impairment
approach requires the court to focus exclusively on determinations
which the judiciary is competent to make.153 Thus, implementation
of the comparative impairment approach is more appropriate to the
United States separation of powers concept.
The third criterion requires an assessment of the extent to which
the methods under consideration take into account the ideal resolu-
tion of the problem. The ideal resolution of true conflicts over the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law is multilateral agree-
ment-sovereigns negotiating compromise in the promotion of inter-
nal objectives. 54 The primary impact of multilateral agreements on
151. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
152. Consideration of the possible effect of the exercise of jurisdiction on U.S. foreign
relations, see text accompanying supra note 60, for example, is clearly not within the
court's competence. Rather, it is a concern belonging exclusively to the executive branch.
153. As in purely domestic cases, the analysis is within the court's competence. Cf.
supra note 108.
154. For Currie's criticism of international agreement in the resolution of conflicts, see
supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. Currie admits that despite the problem of
compromising objectives, international agreement is the only method available to sover-
eigns for resolution of conflicts. See supra note 114.
Baxter's writings advocate a bilateral negotiation process, which he describes as
follows:
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the extraterritorial reach of laws would be on the internal objectives
underlying those laws. The comparative impairment approach
focuses exclusively on the elements to be negotiated, while the juris-
dictional rule of reason considers a broader range of factors. Fur-
thermore, the comparative impairment approach forces foreign
litigants and foreign governments to frame internal objectives, an
activity necessary as a prelude to negotiation.
In summary, a sovereign which is the dominant arbiter of a
class of true, international conflicts, is more likely to minimize
impairment of its internal objectives if it chooses a conflicts rule that
applies normative principles. The United States, as the dominant
arbiter of its antitrust law, should choose the comparative impair-
ment approach over the jurisdictional rule of reason. In the long
run, accommodating foreign objections by application of the com-
parative impairment approach will result in the maximum promo-
tion of U.S. interests. It will forestall blocking legislation, force
governments to frame their national interests, and set the stage for
multilateral negotiation.
Each [sovereign] at the outset might unreasonably demand application of its law
in every situation having any contact with its'state. But as each became aware
that the other had roughly equal bargaining power and tactical skill, the usual
fruits of negotiation would emerge: each would cautiously give up what it
wanted less to obtain what it wanted more, each side's perception of its own self-
interest and of the other's objective would sharpen, and the final agreement
would approximate maximum utility to each. In the course of negotiations the
participants would realize the basis of this particular conflict. . .: the lawmakers
had allocated differently certain costs of civilized society.
Baxter, supra note 115, at 7.
Several other commentators propose negotiation for conflict resolution and discard the
unilateral approach.
Miller suggests that studies be undertaken by groups of nations to "serve as a factual
basis for cooperative action against restrictive practices in international trade." Miller,
Extraterritorial Effects of Trade Regulation, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1092, 1115 (1963). San-
ford states that in disputes between governmental policies:
[iut is inappropriate for one of the governments involved in the policy conflict to
seek to impose its desired solution by invoking its domestic law before its tribu-
nals to adjudicate the legality of conduct in another jurisdiction. The difference
should be resolved, as are other intergovernmental differences, by consultation
and negotiation.
Sanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A
View from Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 201 (1978). See generally W. FUGATE,
FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAW 460-66 (2d ed. 1973); A. EHRENZWEIG,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, GENERAL PART 27-47 (1967).
Tsoris contends that a unilateral approach is inherently inadequate, and a multilateral
approach is unlikely for the present. Thus, "bilateral agreements between the United
States and concerned nations present the most attractive alternative." See Note, supra
note 94, at 447.
Rahl suggests that international conflicts be submitted to the International Court of
Justice. H. RAHL, COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST 411-13 (1970). See
also McClelland, Toward a More Mature System of International Commercial Arbitra-
tion, 5 N.C. INT'L L. AND COMM. REG. 169 (1980) (proposing new methods of settling
international contracts disputes).
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D. THE COMPARATIVE IMPAIRMENT APPROACH APPLIED
Baxter's comparative impairment method relies strongly on the
analysis of the facts of each individual case. 15 A complete explana-
tion of the method requires examples. Before proceeding to the
examples of a false conflicts case, cases where one nation's interests
predominate, and a borderline case, some conclusions may be stated.
First, the comparative impairment method is difficult to implement
in borderline cases--cases "that thwart easy application of every
principle of law."'156 In such cases, "[t]he judge decides on the basis
of some marginal factor and justifies his decision as best he can
. . . ,,.s7 Baxter contends that this fate for borderline cases is pref-
erable to the application of a mechanical rule.158 Second, in all true
conflicts where one state's objectives are obviously more pertinent,
the application of the comparative impairment method will achieve
the most desirable result, measured by normative criteria. 5 9 Third
and finally, the comparative impairment approach highlights false
conflicts and mandates the quick resolution of such cases according
to the relevant normative factors. 60
L False Conflict Example
A Swiss corporation and a U.S. corporation both manufacture
widgets for sale in the United States. The U.S. corporation imports
widgets from its wholly-owned European subsidiary. The Swiss cor-
poration exports to the United States from its wholly-owned subsidi-
ary located elsewhere in Europe. In Switzerland the Swiss and U.S.
corporations agree to divide the U.S. market for widgets. The Swiss
corporation will supply the northeastern states, and the U.S. corpo-
ration will supply the southern and western states. Due to the cost
structure and the demand curve for widgets, the Swiss and U.S. cor-
porations supply the bulk of the U.S. demand for widgets. Because
they do not compete in their respective territories, prices rise to the
monopoly level. The U.S. government sues both corporations for
violating Section One of the Sherman Act.' 6'
In a purely domestic case, allocation of markets between com-
155. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
156. Baxter, supra note 115, at 9.
157. Id But see infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text, where this Note proposes
an alternative resolution for borderline conflicts.
158. Baxter, supra note 115, at 9.
159. See supra notes 144-54 and accompanying text.
160. See text accompanying supra note 105.
161. See supra note 11.
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petitors is aper se violation of the Sherman Act.162 Because U.S.
commerce in widgets is directly and substantially affected by the
agreement, a U.S. court could exercise jurisdiction over the action.
163
Under the comparative impairment approach, it is necessary to
determine whether the case implicates any internal objectives under-
lying Swiss law.
Under authority of the Federal Act on Cartels and Similar
Organizations, Switzerland's Cartels Commission, on special
inquiry, may prohibit an agreement that prevents competition and
injures Swiss markets or consumers. 164 Unlike the United States,
which has a per se rule against the allocation of markets between
competitors, Switzerland apparently does not automatically consider
market allocation agreements injurious to the Swiss public interest.
The Swiss rule requires a special inquiry and a finding that the mar-
ket allocation causes actual harm. 165 Thus, an implied underlying
objective of the Swiss rule is to permit anti-competitive agreements
that are benign to the Swiss public interest. Another, more obvious,
objective of the Swiss rule is to protect Swiss markets and consumers
from harmful anticompetitive agreements. In the hypothetical situa-
tion, Swiss markets and consumers are not harmed by the agreement
to divide the U.S. market; therefore, this Swiss objective is not
implicated.
In the above hypothetical, the widgets are neither produced nor
sold in Switzerland. Swiss markets and consumers are not affected
by the agreement. Therefore, the application of U.S. antitrust laws
will not impair the Swiss objective. The conflict is false and the
court should apply U.S. antitrust laws.'
66
162. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951);
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
163. See supra note 55. The court must always answer the threshold question of
whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. For the comparative impair-
ment approach, this question is answered by reference to whether the allegedly unlawful
activity has an effect on U.S. commerce sufficient to be cognizable as an antitrust viola-
tion. The determination of antitrust law subject matter jurisdiction in U.S. courts is
essentially a determination of whether the plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to implicate
U.S. internal objectives underlying the antitrust laws. Thus, in the case of a false conflict
where the United States has no interest implicated, the court dismisses the action for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The conflict in the text's hypothetical situation is false
because it implicates no foreign objectives.
164. OECD, COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF LEGISLATIONS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS
PRACTICES 32 (1971).
165. Id
166. For false conflicts, Currie's approach and the comparative impairment approach
to interest analysis are identical. Baxter, supra note 115, at 3-4. Under a jurisdictional
rule of reason approach, the court would find no conflict with foreign laws or policies.
This, however, would not end the inquiry. Presumably, the court would find that most of
the factors of comity weigh heavily in favor of the application of U.S. law. See supra
11811983]
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Foreign objections to the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws concentrate on the conflict between the U.S. law and
foreign internal objectives. 67 When there are no foreign internal
objectives implicated, no source for objection exists. Thus, courts
should apply U.S. antitrust laws to international activity in a false
conflict situation.1
2. Dominant Foreign Interest Example
The widget producing firms in the German Federal Republic
are all small to medium-sized. The primary purchasers of German
widgets are U.S. manufacturers that incorporate the widgets into
several finished products. The widgets represent approximately one-
tenth of the cost of the finished products and must be made to order.
A close substitute for German widgets is available in the United
States and the U.S. manufacturers use it in ten percent of the
finished products.
The German firms agree to divide the U.S. market and allocate
primary purchasers exclusively to certain firms. Such an agreement
ordinarily violates Section One of the Republic's Act Against
Restraints of Competition.168 Section 5b of the Act,169 however, per-
mits agreements in restraint of trade if they promote efficiency in
small or medium-sized firms.170 Pursuant to Section 5b, the German
firms file a notification of their agreement with the cartel author-
ity.' 7 ' They present convincing evidence to the cartel authority that
the allocation of U.S. market subdivisions is required to avoid ineffi-
ciencies that would render their businesses unprofitable. Each firm
would require equipment modifications if they had to compete for
short-term contracts on made-to-order widgets from multiple pur-
notes 51, 60 & 65 and accompanying text. The factors concerning (1) the relative signifi-
cance of the effect on U.S. commerce compared to the effect abroad, (2) forseeability of
the effect on U.S. commerce, and (3) intent to harm U.S. commerce suggest, for example,
that U.S. law should be applied in this case. On the other hand, factors such as
(1) whether an order for relief would be acceptable in the United States if made by the
foreign nation under similar circumstances, and (2) nationalities of the parties, are
ambiguous. Such inquiries are extralegal and, therefore, are not within the competence
of the court. Furthermore, proponents of the jurisdictional rule of reason provide no
justification for the relevance of comity factors such as the availability of a remedy
abroad. Therefore, the broader inquiry under the jurisdictional rule of reason is, without
justification, more difficult to apply than is the comparative impairment analysis, and is
more likely to result in error.
167. See supra note 150.
168. Act Against Restraints of Competition, § 1, BGB 1, I.S. 458 (as amended Apr. 26,
1980).
169. Id. at § 5b.
170. Permitting such agreements is termed "rationalization" of the economic activi-
ties. id
171. Id.
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chasers throughout the United States. These equipment modifica-
tions would be inefficient.
Several U.S. purchasers are unable to obtain contracts from
German firms that charge lower prices to other purchasers. They
institute suit against the cartel organization and each of the member
firms. In a wholly domestic case, market allocation agreements
between competitors in the United States are per se illegal. 72 The
agreement significantly affects U.S. commerce in widgets and the
end-products incorporating widgets. Thus, the threshold inquiry
supports the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts.
173
In this situation, the U.S. antitrust laws seek to protect U.S. wid-
get purchasers from monopoly pricing or supply restriction which
may result from the German market allocation agreement. The Ger-
man competition law seeks to protect both small and medium-sized
firms from ruinous competition. Because both the United States and
the Republic have internal objectives implicated in this situation, the
U.S. court must compare the potential impairment to determine
which country has the most pertinent interest.
On these facts, the German interests are more pertinent and the
court will not apply the U.S. antitrust laws. This result is reached by
hypothesizing the application of each law and testing its effect on the
internal objectives of the other nation. 174 After performing this com-
parative impairment test, the court selects the law which least
impairs the internal objectives of the other nation.
175
The application of the German law, allowing the market alloca-
tion agreement, will not significantly affect the U.S. internal objec-
tives. Allowing the market allocation agreement is unlikely to
promote monopoly price levels or reduced supply in U.S. markets.
The size of the producing firms suggests that entry into the widget
industry does not require substantial capital investment. Thus, the
potential for entry is high if the German firms begin to extract
monopoly profits from the sale of widgets in the United States. New
producing firms will. enter the widget market, attracted by the
monopoly price. This increased competition will tend to reduce the
price to competitive levels. Additionally, production and demand
substitution factors will combine to diminish the potential for
reduced supplies in U.S. markets. Because widgets are made to
order, the German firms are unlikely to restrict supply to raise
prices. Furthermore, some German firms charge lower prices to
172. See supra note 162.
173. See supra note 55.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 122-30.
175. See supra text accompanying note 129.
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their U.S. market subdivisions suggesting a high demand price elas-
ticity in certain sectors of the U.S. market, possibly arising from the
closeness of the widget substitute. These market conditions diminish
the potential for harm to U.S. purchasers.
Conversely, applying the U.S. antitrust law, and thus disallow-
ing the market allocation agreement, will significantly affect the Ger-
man internal objectives. Assuming the U.S. court applies an
effective enforcement mechanism, it will thwart the German interest
in protecting small businesses from ruinous competition. Because
the United States is the primary market for German widgets,
enforced competition among German firms for United States
purchase contracts will produce the same inefficiencies suffered by
the producers before their agreement. The very harm that the Ger-
man exemption seeks to avoid will occur. Thus, whereas the impair-
ment of the U.S. protective interest is likely to be insubstantial if the
court abstains from exercising jurisdiction, the German protective
interest will be totally impaired by application of the U.S. law. The
comparative impairment method would operate to choose
abstention.
The above hypothetical illustrates the sacrifice that the compar-
ative impairment method imposes on U.S. objectives.17 6 This Note
proposes that in a case such as this one, where the foreign interest is
more impaired than the U.S. interest, a U.S. court should decline
jurisdiction. Foreign objections to the extraterritorial application of
U.S. antitrust law are strongest when the foreign objectives are more
pertinent.177 Deferring to foreign objectives when they are more
pertinent, therefore, removes the source of the strongest foreign
176. Under Currie's approach, the court would apply U.S. antitrust law to the hypo-
thetical case because the activity implicates U.S. objectives. See supra text following note
117. The disposition of this case under the jurisdictional rule of reason is uncertain. The
conflict between United States and German policies weighs in favor of abstention. The
intended, forseeable effect on United States commerce, however, weighs in favor of the
application of U.S. antitrust law. Thus, a reasonable consideration of the comity factors
could result in the application of U.S. law. The comparative impairment analysis reveals
that, focusing on the fundamental concern of internal objectives, the U.S. interest should
yield to the more pertinent German interest. The broad inquiry under the jurisdictional
rule of reason fails to give a court sufficient guidance in the determination. Because
foreign objections are rooted in foreign internal objectives, the dispersion of the court's
focus under the jurisdictional rule of reason is inappropriate to the reasonable accommo-
dation of foreign objections. Furthermore, the uncertainty of the result under the juris-
dictional rule of reason supports the proposition that the method "is simply an open
invitation to the court to decide for itself." See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
Thus, the jurisdictional rule of reason casts the court in a policy-making role. Such a role
is outside the court's competence, whereas, when applying the comparative impairment
method, the court is exercising the judicial function of analyzing the objectives underly-
ing competing rules of decision.
177. For an analysis of the interrelation between foreign internal objectives and the
extraterritorial application of the United States antitrust laws, see supra note 150.
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objections. By sacrificing less pertinent U.S. interests, the court
accommodates foreign objections, and dissuades the foreign state
from attempting to thwart U.S. objectives. By focusing exclusively
on internal objectives, the comparative impairment method makes
the optimal trade-off. The method impairs United States objectives
when the U.S. interest is less significant, while it accommodates
those objectives when they are strongest.
3. Dominant United States Interest Example
An Austrian firm produces various types of widgets for sale to
wholesalers for worldwide distribution. The firm imposes minimum
retail selling prices, withholding supply to any wholesaler reselling
to a retailer that undercuts the price. 178 Thus, U.S. retailers must
agree to observe the minimum retail price in order to purchase the
Austrian widgets, and wholesalers must agree to sell only to the
retailers observing the minimum price. One U.S. retailer advertises
and sells widgets below the minimum price; the Austrian firm and all
wholesalers subsequently refuse to supply the retailer. The U.S. gov-
ernment initiates a suit against the Austrian firm and all U.S. whole-
salers based upon the excluded retailer's complaint.
The Austrian firm's activity would be a violation of the Sher-
man Act in a wholly domestic case. 179 Austrian law, however, per-
mits verticle price maintenance, subject to cartel registration. The
Cartel Court grants registration if it finds the activity "justified from
the point of view of the national economy" and finds the prices not
to be excessive. 180 In this hypothetical, the Cartel Court sanctioned
the arrangement.
On these facts, the U.S. interests are more pertinent than the
Austrian and the court will apply the U.S. antitrust laws. This result
is reached by hypothesizing an application of each law and testing its
effects on the internal objectives of the other nation.' 81 After this
comparative impairment test, the court selects the law which least
impairs the internal objectives of the other nation. 182 If the U.S.
178. For a discussion of the profit-making goals behind retail price maintenance, see
Posner, The Rule ofReason and the Economic Approach: Refections on the Sylvania Deci-
sion, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1977); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept;Price
Fixing andMarket Division II, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966); Tesler, Why ShouldManufactur-
ers Want Fair Trade, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 86 (1962).
179. See United States v. Parke, Davis and Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
180. Austrian Cartels Act of November 22, 1972, § 24. The Austrian law explicitly
exempts from its purview cartels relating to foreign markets. Id at § 5(1)2. The mean-
ing of the exemption, however, is unclear. If the wholesalers in this hypothetical situa-
tion are Austrian, then the Act may apply regardless of the effect on foreign markets.
The discussion in the text assumes that the Act applies.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 122-30.
182. See supra text accompanying note 129.
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court declines jurisdiction, domestic retailers could agree with
wholesalers to fix the U.S. retail price for Austrian widgets, impair-
ing the U.S. objectives of protecting consumers and promoting com-
petition. The U.S. law seeks to protect U.S. consumers from the
pernicious effects of price fixing and to promote competition among
retailers to effect the efficient allocation of resources.
The Austrian Cartels Act provides for registration of retail price
maintenance agreements so that if the Cartel Court finds that the
Austrian economy would not be adversely affected, an Austrian
manufacturer can benefit from such an agreement. In this case, the
Austrian firm produces for worldwide consumption. Thus, if the
court exercises jurisdiction and applies U.S. antitrust law, any rem-
edy will affect only part of the Austrian firm's retail market. Fur-
thermore, the remedy will not affect the Austrian firm's price to U.S.
wholesalers. Thus, if the court applies U.S. antitrust law, the benefit
of retail price maintenance to the Austrian firm will not be com-
pletely lost. Correspondingly, the Austrian objective of benefiting
certain manufacturers will not be completely impaired. Therefore,
the court's abstention would impair U.S. interests more than its exer-
cise of jurisdiction would impair Austrian interests. By comparative
impairment analysis, the court should apply U.S. antitrust law.
In any true conflicts case, one jurisdiction's objectives prevail.
As the dominant arbiter of conflicts implicating antitrust law objec-
tives, the United States seeks to minimize impairment of those objec-
tives. To pursue that goal through unilateral judicial resolution of
conflicts, the United States must apply a choice method that contem-
plates the potential for impairment resulting from foreign objections.
The comparative impairment approach focuses on the source of for-
eign objections and provides a choice criterion which is appropriate
for judicial application. The approach chooses to impair the least
pertinent objectives; therefore, it chooses to defer to foreign objec-
tions when impairment of those objectives would evoke the strongest
objections. Likewise, the comparative impairment method chooses
U.S. law when the source of foreign objections is weakest. Thus, the
choice of U.S. law in this case, on the basis that the U.S. interest is
more pertinent, is a trade-off of foreign objections for the realization
of U.S. objectives. The choice is the result of a rational analysis of
the competing interests. The comparative impairment approach,
unlike the alternative choice doctrines, recognizes both the trade-off
involved in the determination and the limits of judicial
competence. 183
183. Currie's approach to interest analysis would also choose to apply U.S. law in this
situation; however, the analysis ignores the fundamental concern with internal objectives.
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4. Balanced Interest Example
Borderline cases arise whenever a choice doctrine applies nor-
mative criteria. Under the comparative impairment approach,
courts will face cases in which the respective interests appear bal-
anced. The interests are balanced if each state's underlying objec-
tives are equally impaired by application of the other state's rule of
decision. In the context of U.S. antitrust laws, the interests are bal-
anced if application of the U.S. antitrust laws will impair foreign
objectives to the same extent that abstention will impair U.S.
objectives.
In a true conflict where the respective state interests are bal-
anced, the comparative impairment method does not provide a solu-
tion. Neither applicable law will minimize the impairment of
internal objectives. This Note proposes that when interests are bal-
anced in antitrust cases, the United States should mechanically apply
its own law. No other nation desires to enforce the U.S. antitrust
laws. As the dominant arbiter, the United States must apply a nor-
mative conflict of laws rule. Nevertheless, the dominant arbiter may,
in limited circumstances, such as borderline cases, satisfy a secon-
dary conflict of laws goal. The application of the law of the forum in
borderline cases will allow litigants to predict, prior to their activity,
which law will apply.'8
4
The application of a mechanical rule applying U.S. antitrust
law in balanced interest cases raises two questions. First, is a
mechanical rule appropriate? A normative criterion that uniformly
serves some U.S. objective obviates the need for a mechanical rule.
No such normative criterion commends itself in this situation
because U.S. courts are not competent to formulate or implement
policies relegated to the legislative or executive branches of the fed-
eral government. Therefore, a mechanical rule is appropriate. Sec-
ond, should U.S. courts apply U.S. antitrust law or should they
abstain from exercising jurisdiction in balanced interest cases? Both
choice rules promote predictability. The abstention rule, however,
removes balanced cases from the U.S. sphere of control. Foreign
states would not need to negotiate for control. The application of
The result in this situation under the jurisdictional rule of reason is uncertain. See supra
note 176. Thus, it is possible that the application of the comity doctrine would not result
in the optimal decision in this case.
184. Cf. Baxter, supra note 115, at 3. Baxter identifies two elements necessary for a
litigant to predict the applicable law at the time of his activity. Each forum's choice of
law rule must be predictable and consistent. In the instant case, a litigant bringing a
balanced interest claim can be certain that the court will apply U.S. law. In addition,
only U.S. courts apply the U.S. antitrust laws, so that a choice of forum will not disturb
the litigants ability to predict the applicable law. See supra notes 137-41 and accompa-
nying text.
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U.S. antitrust laws, on the other hand, preserves the need for inter-
national negotiation. According to Baxter, multilateral negotiation
is the ideal. 85 Neither mechanical rule, abstention nor application,
better approximates the ideal. Thus, the rule which preserves the
need for negotiation is superior. Therefore, the courts should apply
U.S. antitrust law wherever the U.S. and foreign interests are equally
balanced.
The following hypothetical, modelled after In re Uranium Anti-
trust Litigation, 186 illustrates a balanced interest case. In an effort to
promote sales of electricity-generating nuclear reactors, a U.S. pro-
ducer of nuclear reactors entered into long-term contracts with
domestic and foreign utility companies to supply uranium. The U.S.
corporation did not contract to purchase uranium to cover these
long-term contracts. When the world price of uranium increased
more than six-fold over a four year period, it was forced to renege on
its contracts. The utility companies sued.
In its defense, the U.S. corporation alleged that a cartel of ura-
nium producers caused the price increase. The cartel activities were
approved by the Canadian government, though no act of state was
involved. 1
8 7
To properly adjudicate the price-fixing allegations, the U.S.
courts require information located in Canada. The Canadian firms,
however, are disinclined to supply the necessary documents, and the
Canadian government supports their refusal. United States com-
merce is directly and substantially affected by the cartel's alleged
activity, which the U.S. corporation blames for its breach of the con-
tracts with U.S. and foreign utility companies. Price-fixing is among
the most pernicious activities covered by U.S. antitrust laws. 8 8 The
United States, therefore, has a strong interest in acquiring the infor-
mation and adjudicating the claims.
Canada desires to protect its private firms from prosecution
when they are cooperating in the implementation of national eco-
185. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
186. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See also lower court cases by the same name at
480 F. Supp. 1138; 473 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Recent Developments, Antitrust
Law:,Extraterritoriality, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 515 (1980). The Westinghouse suit charged
twenty-nine defendants as conspirators. Nine defaulted, including one Canadian firm.
Besides Canada, the other foreign nations identified with defendants are Australia, South
Africa, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. The hypothetical in the text is confined to
the United States-Canada conflict.
187. In In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, the court stated: "While the governments
of the foreign participants in this alleged conspiracy are acting and admittedly sympa-
thetic to the economic determinism of the defaulters, there is no claim that the alleged
conduct of the defaulters is mandated by these governments." Therefore, the act of state
defense was unavailable. 617 F.2d at 1254 n.21.
188. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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nomic policy. 18 9 Resisting U.S. efforts to obtain the information pro-
motes that objective. The issue in this case is not whether the U.S.
court should provide a remedy for the failure to produce informa-
tion, but whether the U.S. court should exercise jurisdiction over the
Canadian defendants.
The U.S. interest in protecting U.S. nationals from price-fixing
would be totally impaired by abstention. Similarly, the Canadian
interest in protecting the private sector from penalties for pursuing
Candian national economic interests would be totally impaired by
the application of U.S. antitrust laws. A U.S. court applying the
comparative impairment method would find the respective internal
objectives equally balanced. Therefore, the court would use the
mechanical rule and choose to apply U.S. antitrust law. There is no
basis for finding that either abstention or the application of U.S. law
would better approximate the negotiation results. If the U.S. court
abstained from exercising jurisdiction in this borderline case, it
would be allocating control over borderline cases to Canada.
Canada would have nothing more to gain with respect to borderline
cases implicating U.S. antitrust law objectives. Therefore, the deci-
189. Sanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States.-
A Viewfrom Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195, 205-06 (1978). Sanford, the Director
General, Bureau of Commercial and Commodity Relations, Department of External
Affairs, Ottawa, states:
Canada and the United States provide information to each other freely in the
course of consultation and negotiation to the extent that their laws permit ....
What, then, is the element in the request for information about uranium market-
ing, for example, that sets it apart and leads normally cooperative governments
to resist [United States] efforts to obtain information? I believe the answer is that
. . . unlike normal judicial assistance, this request concerns a proceeding that the
requested governments have reason to believe may be inimical to their national
interests. To be more specific, if the Canadian Government transmits or permits
the transmission of information from Canada to the United States to assist the
prosecution of persons or corporations for acts done outside the United States at
the request or encouragement of the Canadian Government, then the next time
Canada seeks similar cooperation from the private sector of the Canadian econ-
omy in the implementation of national economic policy, it must expect the mul-
tinationals in Canada first to seek the advice of their [United States] legal
counsel, and then to comply with the Canadian request only if compliance will
not expose them or their [United States] affiliates to legal proceedings in the
United States. Consequently, if the Canadian Government is not prepared to
accord what protection it can to private firms prosecuted abroad for complying
with Canadian policy, it cannot reasonably expect the future cooperation of
those firms in carrying out measures it judges to be in the Canadian economic
interest. The private sector would thus become more responsive to [United
States] law than to Canadian law and policy in determining whether and to what
extent it would act in the Canadian interest. This is not a result that a foreign
government can accept.
Sanford suggests that if the United States ignores the Canadian interest, future cases will
meet with blocking legislation or other direct governmental intervention in order to
establish appropriate sovereign defenses to the extraterritorial application of U.S. anti-
trust law. Id
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sion would obviate negotiation for control over that class of cases.
The application of U.S. law in this situation, however, preserves the
need for negotiation because the United States retains control, at
least to the extent that U.S. enforcement mechanisms are effective.
Both the United States and Canada could benefit from negotiating
over control because both could exchange less desirable spheres of
control for more desirable ones. This in turn would maximize the
scope and impact of their respective internal objectives. Thus, when
the court chooses to apply U.S. antitrust laws, it preserves the poten-
tial for a resolution of the conflict through negotiation. 190
III
INTEREST ANALYSIS AS A PRELUDE TO
MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATION
The international economic environment contains neither an
independent arbiter for disputes nor a regulatory institution. Nego-
tiation is, as a result, the optimal method to resolve conflicting inter-
nal objectives raised by international commercial activity.' 91
Negotiation provides a constructive resolution to these conflicts.
National hegemony over and retaliation against certain resolutions
of conflicts, on the other hand, are destructive.
A sovereign's bargaining power reflects the extent to which it
could promote its interests inilaterally. In negotiations, each sover-
eign uses that bargaining power to extend its interests by exchanging
less desirable spheres of control for more desirable ones. Therefore,
through negotiation, each sovereign maximizes the extent of its
interests.
In the absence of negotiation, each sovereign provides a mecha-
nism for resolving conflicts. In the United States, the judicial system
provides the process. Its limited competence restricts the choice of a
conflicts resolution doctrine. 192  The comparative impairment
approach, which identifies internal objectives and assesses the perti-
190. The effect of the mechanical rule in borderline cases is to create a presumption in
favor of the application of U.S. antitrust law. The rule only applies, however, when
comparative impairment analysis fails to provide a solution. Thus, the rule does not
create a presumption that U.S. objectives are more pertinent. The steps in the analytical
process proposed in this Note must remain independent if the process is to honor the
rationale justifying it. First, the court determines whether the case implicates any foreign
objectives. Second, the court compares the potential impairment of United States and
foreign objectives by either the abstention from or exercise of jurisdiction, respectively.
Third, if and only if systematic examination reveals that United States and foreign objec-
tives are equally pertinent, the court applies the mechanical rule and chooses to exercise
jurisdiction and apply U.S. antitrust law.
191. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
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nence of competing states' interests, is appropriate for judicial appli-
cation. 93 In addition, this approach takes into account the ideal of
negotiation.
94
Actual negotiation involves a face-to-face confrontation; a
court, however, must act unilaterally. Judicial conflict resolution is
not a close substitute for the ideal of negotiation. In a negotiation,
two sovereigns might agree to resolve two classes of conflicts by ced-
ing one sphere of control to the other. A court, however, must
resolve a conflict in a single case. If the court considers the sover-
eigns' internal objectives, it will, at least, consider the appropriate
subject matter. The competing objectives would be the focus of
negotiation. In addition, the comparative impairment approach
forces foreign nations to frame their national interests, a necessary
prelude to negotiation. Finally, the adoption of the comparative
impairment test may signal a serious U.S. effort to temper the extra-
territorial application of its antitrust laws and promote a spirit of
international negotiation. The comparative impairment approach
for the resolution of conflicts is, therefore, both an appropriate doc-
trine for judicial application and an approach calculated to take into
account the negotiation ideal. The alternative doctrines considered
in this Note do not share these two qualities.
The Alcoa effects doctrine does not consider competing internal
objectives. 95 Currie's approach to interest analysis, 196 and other
mechanical choice doctrines, 197 also ignore competing objectives.
The jurisdictional rule of reason requires the court to consider fac-
tors inappropriate to judicial determination. 198 Thus, the compara-
tive impairment method is a superior doctrine for unilateral conflict
resolution in the United States, where the judicial system provides
the process by which actors can invoke sovereign interests.
CONCLUSION
U.S. courts currently apply the Alcoa effects doctrine and the
jurisdictional rule of reason in various forms when determining the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. Both methods of
analysis are deficient. The Alcoa doctrine does not consider foreign
objections to the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law and
prompts foreign legislation blocking discovery and enforcement of
United States judgments. The jurisdictional rule of reason requires
193. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 18-33 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 106-17 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
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the courts to engage in inquiries outside of the realm of judicial
competence.
The comparative impairment approach provides significant
improvements over both the Alcoa effects test, and the jurisdictional
rule of reason. The comparative impairment approach accommo-
dates foreign objections by considering the competing objectives
implicated in an individual case and applying U.S. law only when
the U.S. interest is more pertinent. This approach confines the judi-
cial inquiry to identification and assessment of the internal objec-
tives underlying the laws and policies of the respective jurisdictions,
a task particularly within the realm of judicial competence.
Multilateral negotiation is the ideal method for resolving con-
flicts. Through negotiation each jurisdiction can maximize the
extent of its interest by trading less desirable spheres of control for
more desirable ones. The focus of negotiation would be the internal
objectives of each sovereign. The comparative impairment approach
analyzes internal objectives exclusively. It forces sovereigns to frame
their national interests, setting the stage for multilateral negotiation.
Thus, U.S. courts should eschew the Alcoa doctrine and the jurisdic-
tional rule of reason in favor of the comparative impairment
approach to interest analysis in the determination of the extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. antitrust law.
Edward A. Rosic, Jr.
